土耳其的学生贷款政治:通过专制的债务主义来控制年轻人

IF 3.8 2区 经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS
Havva Ezgi Dogru
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Based on a detailed interrogation of the official documents and in-depth interviews with defaulters, this article argues that authoritarian debtfarism has imposed a rigid market discipline over the university youth by using non-transparency and arbitrariness as its governance mechanisms. Consequently, future labour of the graduates is put on hold through a long-term debt relation, compelling them to integrate into labour market precariously as a new segment of the relative surplus population.KEYWORDS: Student loan politicsTurkeyauthoritarianismdebthigher education AcknowledgementsI am thankful for the feedback received on a previous version of this paper, which was presented at the 17th National Social Science Congress organised by the Turkish Social Sciences Association in February 2023. The author expresses gratitude to Susanne Soederberg, Canan Şahin, and Rebecca Hall for their valuable feedback.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Like Turkey, China, India and Brazil experienced a rapid increase in their gross enrollment rates. To illustrate, from 2001 to 2021, the GER increased from 8 to 64 per cent in China, from 10 in to 31 per cent in India and from 21 to 55 per cent in Brazil (Ziderman Citation2023, World Bank Citation2023a). This trend was accompanied with the expansion of student loans, with 30 per cent of the total university students taking loans in China (Yang Citation2017), 26 per cent in India (Chalil Citation2021), 40 per cent in Brazil (Lavinas et al. Citation2019) and 27 per cent in Turkey (see Figure 2). The reason why time reference for these countries is not standardised is a lack of data regarding the countries mentioned.2 While accurate default rates are unavailable, non-performing assets rose in the late 2010s, which reaches one-third in some states of India (Chalil Citation2021, p. 128) and 30 per cent in some underdeveloped regions in China (Cai et al. Citation2019, p. 98), 47 per cent in Brazil (Lavinas et al. Citation2019).3 The data is retrieved from the same source used for Figure 2. Please see the endnote 14.4 These figures have been computed using data from TUIK's 2022 fourth-quarter statistics and İŞKUR's January 2023 statistics, as compiled by the ‘Young Unemployed’ platform. This initiative, comprising social scientists, aims to support and connect unemployed youth by providing monthly data insights. Available from https://gencissizler.org/2023/02/17/genc-issizlik-bulteni-subat-2023/ [Accessed 10 May 2023].5 I computed the student debt to GDP ratio annually using ‘lending amounts’ (code 08) from CoA reports on KYK and Ministry of Youth and Sports. In contrast to highly financialized student loan systems in the Global North, where rising default rates have a contagion effect on the economy due to large student loan portfolios to GDP ratios,,with 6.5 per cent in the US (Kirney and Tanzş Citation2022) and 5.5 per cent in the UK (Keep and Bolton Citation2018), neither the amount of student loan to GDP ratio, 0.097 per cent by 2021, nor the volume of default rates would create a disastrous effect on the Turkish economy (The amount of student loan to GDP ratio is following: 0.15126 per cent in 2013; 0.22972 per cent in 2014; 0.15958 per cent in 2015; 0.21313 per cent in 2016; 0.18894 per cent in 2017; 0.17115 per cent 2018; 0.16144 per cent 2019; 0.13714 per cent in 2020; 0.09662 per cent in 2021).6 Koç, Sabancı, Özyeğin, and Yaşar universities are established and privately owned by influential members of TUSIAD.7 The author’s new research is on the link between massification project and sub-national development outside the traditional urban centres. The referenced book is a thoroughly documented journalistic account detailing students’ experiences and the difficulties they encounter in local exploitative economies.8 The number of foundation universities which are privately funded has also increased almost threefold from 26 to 79 between 2005 and 2022.Given that the primary focus of the article is on the connection between the growth of public universities and student loan systems developed for the students from low-income background, discussions concerning private universities have been deliberately omitted.9 New universities founded after 2006 have an annual capacity of 223,082, according to OSYM. Multiplying this by the 4-year average completion time in higher education estimates a total of one million.10 For the AKP government, the Ziraat Bank became an essential financial public asset for expanding consumer and housing credits giving the government an ability to control the interest rates. It is also used as a resource for cheap credit to small and medium-sized enterprises and for the AKP government's mega-projects (Marois and Güngen Citation2013, Akçay and Güngen Citation2019).11 Although access to Court of Accounts reports prior to 2014 is unavailable, the available data paints a concerning picture of a repayment crisis: The outstanding receivables amounted to 936 million dollars in 2014, 812 million dollars in 2015, 1409 million dollars in 2016, 1422 million dollars in 2017, 1794 million dollars in 2018, 1322 million dollars in 2019, 2314 million dollars in 2020, and 2707 million dollars in 2021.12 This illustrative case of the rapidly increasing student loan repayment amount is sourced from the Twitter account of KYK debtors. Available from: https://twitter.com/kykborclulari/status/1546566636978802692/photo/1.Additional informationFundingThe author acknowledges the financial support provided by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) during her postdoctoral research at the Global Development Studies Department at Queen's University in Kingston.Notes on contributorsHavva Ezgi DogruHavva Ezgi Doğru is a political scientist with a PhD from York University, Canada. She is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Anadolu University and currently a visiting scholar in the Development Studies Department at Queen's University. 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By restructuring the Credit and Dormitories Institution (KYK) as subordinated to the executive and insulated from democratic intervention, the authoritarian neoliberal state in Turkey has sought to fulfil its new economic function, i.e. enabling the societal reproduction of the youth by increasing their financial dependency on credit money. The state-led student loan expansion in Turkey emerged in a tuition-free higher education setting without a sophisticated financial infrastructure and in an economic environment marked with perpetual graduate unemployment as well as inflationary pressures on repayment amounts. Based on a detailed interrogation of the official documents and in-depth interviews with defaulters, this article argues that authoritarian debtfarism has imposed a rigid market discipline over the university youth by using non-transparency and arbitrariness as its governance mechanisms. Consequently, future labour of the graduates is put on hold through a long-term debt relation, compelling them to integrate into labour market precariously as a new segment of the relative surplus population.KEYWORDS: Student loan politicsTurkeyauthoritarianismdebthigher education AcknowledgementsI am thankful for the feedback received on a previous version of this paper, which was presented at the 17th National Social Science Congress organised by the Turkish Social Sciences Association in February 2023. The author expresses gratitude to Susanne Soederberg, Canan Şahin, and Rebecca Hall for their valuable feedback.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Like Turkey, China, India and Brazil experienced a rapid increase in their gross enrollment rates. To illustrate, from 2001 to 2021, the GER increased from 8 to 64 per cent in China, from 10 in to 31 per cent in India and from 21 to 55 per cent in Brazil (Ziderman Citation2023, World Bank Citation2023a). This trend was accompanied with the expansion of student loans, with 30 per cent of the total university students taking loans in China (Yang Citation2017), 26 per cent in India (Chalil Citation2021), 40 per cent in Brazil (Lavinas et al. Citation2019) and 27 per cent in Turkey (see Figure 2). The reason why time reference for these countries is not standardised is a lack of data regarding the countries mentioned.2 While accurate default rates are unavailable, non-performing assets rose in the late 2010s, which reaches one-third in some states of India (Chalil Citation2021, p. 128) and 30 per cent in some underdeveloped regions in China (Cai et al. Citation2019, p. 98), 47 per cent in Brazil (Lavinas et al. 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The referenced book is a thoroughly documented journalistic account detailing students’ experiences and the difficulties they encounter in local exploitative economies.8 The number of foundation universities which are privately funded has also increased almost threefold from 26 to 79 between 2005 and 2022.Given that the primary focus of the article is on the connection between the growth of public universities and student loan systems developed for the students from low-income background, discussions concerning private universities have been deliberately omitted.9 New universities founded after 2006 have an annual capacity of 223,082, according to OSYM. Multiplying this by the 4-year average completion time in higher education estimates a total of one million.10 For the AKP government, the Ziraat Bank became an essential financial public asset for expanding consumer and housing credits giving the government an ability to control the interest rates. It is also used as a resource for cheap credit to small and medium-sized enterprises and for the AKP government's mega-projects (Marois and Güngen Citation2013, Akçay and Güngen Citation2019).11 Although access to Court of Accounts reports prior to 2014 is unavailable, the available data paints a concerning picture of a repayment crisis: The outstanding receivables amounted to 936 million dollars in 2014, 812 million dollars in 2015, 1409 million dollars in 2016, 1422 million dollars in 2017, 1794 million dollars in 2018, 1322 million dollars in 2019, 2314 million dollars in 2020, and 2707 million dollars in 2021.12 This illustrative case of the rapidly increasing student loan repayment amount is sourced from the Twitter account of KYK debtors. Available from: https://twitter.com/kykborclulari/status/1546566636978802692/photo/1.Additional informationFundingThe author acknowledges the financial support provided by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) during her postdoctoral research at the Global Development Studies Department at Queen's University in Kingston.Notes on contributorsHavva Ezgi DogruHavva Ezgi Doğru is a political scientist with a PhD from York University, Canada. She is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Anadolu University and currently a visiting scholar in the Development Studies Department at Queen's University. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要过去二十年来,土耳其学生贷款计划的大规模扩张是通过一种治理技术完成的,本文将其定义为专制债务主义。通过重组信贷和宿舍机构(KYK),使其从属于行政部门,不受民主干预,土耳其的威权主义新自由主义国家试图实现其新的经济功能,即通过增加年轻人对信贷货币的经济依赖,使他们能够实现社会再生产。土耳其政府主导的学生贷款扩张,是在高等教育免学费的背景下出现的,没有成熟的金融基础设施,而且经济环境的特点是毕业生永远失业,还款金额面临通胀压力。本文通过对官方文件的详细询问和对违约者的深入访谈,认为威权债务主义以不透明和随意性作为治理机制,对大学青年施加了严格的市场纪律。因此,通过长期债务关系,毕业生的未来劳动力被搁置,迫使他们作为相对过剩人口的新部分不稳定地融入劳动力市场。关键词:学生贷款政治sturkeyauthorarianismdebdeber教育致谢感谢收到的对本文前一版本的反馈,该版本于2023年2月由土耳其社会科学协会组织的第17届全国社会科学大会上发表。作者对Susanne Soederberg, Canan Şahin和Rebecca Hall的宝贵反馈表示感谢。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1与土耳其一样,中国、印度和巴西的毛入学率也出现了快速增长。举例来说,从2001年到2021年,中国的GER从8%上升到64%,印度从10%上升到31%,巴西从21%上升到55% (Ziderman Citation2023, World Bank Citation2023a)。这一趋势伴随着学生贷款的扩大,中国有30%的大学生贷款(Yang Citation2017),印度有26% (Chalil Citation2021),巴西有40% (Lavinas等)。Citation2019)和土耳其的27%(见图2)。这些国家的时间参考没有标准化的原因是缺乏有关上述国家的数据虽然无法获得准确的违约率,但不良资产在2010年代末有所上升,在印度的一些州达到了三分之一(Chalil Citation2021, p. 128),在中国的一些不发达地区达到了30% (Cai等)。Citation2019, p. 98),巴西47% (Lavinas et al.)。Citation2019)。3数据是从图2中使用的相同源中检索的。这些数据是根据TUIK 2022年第四季度统计数据和İŞKUR 2023年1月统计数据计算得出的,由“年轻失业”平台编制。该计划由社会科学家组成,旨在通过每月提供数据见解来支持和联系失业青年。可从https://gencissizler.org/2023/02/17/genc-issizlik-bulteni-subat-2023/获得[2023年5月10日访问]我每年使用“贷款金额”(代码08)计算学生债务与GDP的比率,这些贷款金额来自于KYK和青年和体育部的CoA报告。与全球北方高度金融化的学生贷款体系相反,由于学生贷款组合与GDP的比例很大,违约率上升对经济产生了传染效应,美国为6.5% (Kirney和tanzei Citation2022),英国为5.5% (Keep和Bolton Citation2018),到2021年,学生贷款与GDP的比例都不会达到0.097%,违约率的数量也不会对土耳其经济造成灾难性影响(学生贷款金额与GDP之比如下:2013年为0.15126%;2014年为0.22972%;2015年为0.15958%;2016年为0.21313%;2017年为0.18894%;0.17115% 2018;2019年0.16144%;2020年为0.13714%;2021年为0.09662%)Koç, sabancyi, Özyeğin和ya<e:1>大学是由tusiad的有影响力的成员建立和私人拥有的。7作者的新研究是关于传统城市中心以外的大规模项目与次国家发展之间的联系。这本参考书是一本详尽记录的新闻报道,详细描述了学生们的经历以及他们在当地剥削性经济中遇到的困难私立基础大学的数量也从2005年的26所增加到2022年的79所,增长了近三倍。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The politics of student loan in Turkey: regimenting the youth through authoritarian debtfarism
ABSTRACTThe mass-scale expansion of student loan schemes in Turkey over the last two decades has been accomplished by a governance technique which the article defines as authoritarian debtfarism. By restructuring the Credit and Dormitories Institution (KYK) as subordinated to the executive and insulated from democratic intervention, the authoritarian neoliberal state in Turkey has sought to fulfil its new economic function, i.e. enabling the societal reproduction of the youth by increasing their financial dependency on credit money. The state-led student loan expansion in Turkey emerged in a tuition-free higher education setting without a sophisticated financial infrastructure and in an economic environment marked with perpetual graduate unemployment as well as inflationary pressures on repayment amounts. Based on a detailed interrogation of the official documents and in-depth interviews with defaulters, this article argues that authoritarian debtfarism has imposed a rigid market discipline over the university youth by using non-transparency and arbitrariness as its governance mechanisms. Consequently, future labour of the graduates is put on hold through a long-term debt relation, compelling them to integrate into labour market precariously as a new segment of the relative surplus population.KEYWORDS: Student loan politicsTurkeyauthoritarianismdebthigher education AcknowledgementsI am thankful for the feedback received on a previous version of this paper, which was presented at the 17th National Social Science Congress organised by the Turkish Social Sciences Association in February 2023. The author expresses gratitude to Susanne Soederberg, Canan Şahin, and Rebecca Hall for their valuable feedback.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Like Turkey, China, India and Brazil experienced a rapid increase in their gross enrollment rates. To illustrate, from 2001 to 2021, the GER increased from 8 to 64 per cent in China, from 10 in to 31 per cent in India and from 21 to 55 per cent in Brazil (Ziderman Citation2023, World Bank Citation2023a). This trend was accompanied with the expansion of student loans, with 30 per cent of the total university students taking loans in China (Yang Citation2017), 26 per cent in India (Chalil Citation2021), 40 per cent in Brazil (Lavinas et al. Citation2019) and 27 per cent in Turkey (see Figure 2). The reason why time reference for these countries is not standardised is a lack of data regarding the countries mentioned.2 While accurate default rates are unavailable, non-performing assets rose in the late 2010s, which reaches one-third in some states of India (Chalil Citation2021, p. 128) and 30 per cent in some underdeveloped regions in China (Cai et al. Citation2019, p. 98), 47 per cent in Brazil (Lavinas et al. Citation2019).3 The data is retrieved from the same source used for Figure 2. Please see the endnote 14.4 These figures have been computed using data from TUIK's 2022 fourth-quarter statistics and İŞKUR's January 2023 statistics, as compiled by the ‘Young Unemployed’ platform. This initiative, comprising social scientists, aims to support and connect unemployed youth by providing monthly data insights. Available from https://gencissizler.org/2023/02/17/genc-issizlik-bulteni-subat-2023/ [Accessed 10 May 2023].5 I computed the student debt to GDP ratio annually using ‘lending amounts’ (code 08) from CoA reports on KYK and Ministry of Youth and Sports. In contrast to highly financialized student loan systems in the Global North, where rising default rates have a contagion effect on the economy due to large student loan portfolios to GDP ratios,,with 6.5 per cent in the US (Kirney and Tanzş Citation2022) and 5.5 per cent in the UK (Keep and Bolton Citation2018), neither the amount of student loan to GDP ratio, 0.097 per cent by 2021, nor the volume of default rates would create a disastrous effect on the Turkish economy (The amount of student loan to GDP ratio is following: 0.15126 per cent in 2013; 0.22972 per cent in 2014; 0.15958 per cent in 2015; 0.21313 per cent in 2016; 0.18894 per cent in 2017; 0.17115 per cent 2018; 0.16144 per cent 2019; 0.13714 per cent in 2020; 0.09662 per cent in 2021).6 Koç, Sabancı, Özyeğin, and Yaşar universities are established and privately owned by influential members of TUSIAD.7 The author’s new research is on the link between massification project and sub-national development outside the traditional urban centres. The referenced book is a thoroughly documented journalistic account detailing students’ experiences and the difficulties they encounter in local exploitative economies.8 The number of foundation universities which are privately funded has also increased almost threefold from 26 to 79 between 2005 and 2022.Given that the primary focus of the article is on the connection between the growth of public universities and student loan systems developed for the students from low-income background, discussions concerning private universities have been deliberately omitted.9 New universities founded after 2006 have an annual capacity of 223,082, according to OSYM. Multiplying this by the 4-year average completion time in higher education estimates a total of one million.10 For the AKP government, the Ziraat Bank became an essential financial public asset for expanding consumer and housing credits giving the government an ability to control the interest rates. It is also used as a resource for cheap credit to small and medium-sized enterprises and for the AKP government's mega-projects (Marois and Güngen Citation2013, Akçay and Güngen Citation2019).11 Although access to Court of Accounts reports prior to 2014 is unavailable, the available data paints a concerning picture of a repayment crisis: The outstanding receivables amounted to 936 million dollars in 2014, 812 million dollars in 2015, 1409 million dollars in 2016, 1422 million dollars in 2017, 1794 million dollars in 2018, 1322 million dollars in 2019, 2314 million dollars in 2020, and 2707 million dollars in 2021.12 This illustrative case of the rapidly increasing student loan repayment amount is sourced from the Twitter account of KYK debtors. Available from: https://twitter.com/kykborclulari/status/1546566636978802692/photo/1.Additional informationFundingThe author acknowledges the financial support provided by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey (TUBITAK) during her postdoctoral research at the Global Development Studies Department at Queen's University in Kingston.Notes on contributorsHavva Ezgi DogruHavva Ezgi Doğru is a political scientist with a PhD from York University, Canada. She is a faculty member in the Department of Sociology at Anadolu University and currently a visiting scholar in the Development Studies Department at Queen's University. Her academic interests and publications focus on political economy, state theories, and urbanization.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
10.10
自引率
9.50%
发文量
41
期刊介绍: New Political Economy aims to create a forum for work which combines the breadth of vision which characterised the classical political economy of the nineteenth century with the analytical advances of twentieth century social science. It seeks to represent the terrain of political economy scholarship across different disciplines, emphasising original and innovative work which explores new approaches and methodologies, and addresses core debates and issues of historical and contemporary relevance.
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