激励方案与管理绩效的探索性分析

IF 2.1 Q3 MANAGEMENT
Iryna Alves, Sofia M. Lourenço
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本研究探讨了不同类型的激励(货币激励、非货币激励和利益激励)与管理绩效之间的相互作用。我们通过问卷调查收集数据,并使用定性比较分析(QCA)进行分析。利用来自614位经理的数据,我们确定了与高管理绩效始终相关的多种激励方案。具体地说,我们的分析表明,以自主和发展机会为形式的非金钱激励与高绩效的关系,与其与认可的结合一样,是孤立的。高绩效也可以通过将传统的有形利益与(1)社会支持利益和认可或(2)金钱激励相结合来实现。最后,我们的研究结果表明,与非首席财务官相比,货币激励、社会福利、自主权和发展机会对首席财务官的成功更为重要。相反,有形利益与非首席财务官的高绩效特别相关,但与首席财务官无关。我们的研究结果通过展示公司在实践中使用的成功的激励方案以及它们如何与不同的理论(如代理理论、自决理论和人力资本理论)相关联,为激励文献做出了贡献。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An exploratory analysis of incentive packages and managerial performance
Abstract This study explores the interplay among different types of incentives (monetary incentives, non-monetary incentives, and benefits) and managerial performance. We collect data via a questionnaire and use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to analyze them. Using data from 614 managers, we identify multiple incentive packages that are consistently related to high managerial performance. Specifically, our analyses reveal that non-monetary incentives in the form of autonomy and development opportunities are as related to high performance in isolation as their combination with recognition. High performance can also be achieved with the combination of traditional tangible benefits with (1) social support benefits and recognition or with (2) monetary incentives. Finally, our findings suggest that monetary incentives, social benefits, and autonomy and development opportunities are more important for the success of CFOs than to non-CFOs. Conversely, tangible benefits are particularly relevant for the high performance of non-CFOs but not for CFOs. Our findings contribute to the incentives literature by showing successful incentive packages that companies are using in practice and how they relate to different theories such as agency theory, self-determination theory, and human capital theory.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.60
自引率
15.20%
发文量
17
期刊介绍: Journal of Management Control (JoMaC) is an international journal concerned with the formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter patterns in organizational activities. Particular emphasis is placed on operational and strategic planning and control systems and the processes and techniques.  JoMaC was founded in 1990 as a German journal and has a strong reputation as a dedicated academic journal open to high-quality research on all aspects of management control.  The journal covers such topics as: the role of management control systems in the management of companies and non-profit organizations; the design and use of planning systems for production, marketing, logistics and other fields of use; the interaction between strategic and operational aspects of management control; the role of management accountants and other internal and external service providers, such as financial accountants, auditors and consultants; change and the sustainability of management control systems.   Journal of Management Control especially welcomes empirical and analytical papers reflecting both methodological rigor and practical relevance that make a significant contribution to literature. The journal is interested in literature reviews and meta-analyses showcasing and promoting current academic research. Additional materials relating to papers of interest to scholars (e.g. coding sheets, questionnaires, data, etc.) can be downloaded from our website in order to stimulate future research.Officially cited as: J Manag Control
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