Abductive Inference and Theory of the Inversion of Probability in the Causal Representation of Dynamic Economic Phenomena

In this probabilistic analysis on the treatment of abductive inference in the dynamic economic phenomena it is demonstrated that its foundations coincide with the reasons that gave rise to the “Bernoulli problem” and to the consequent Bayes, Laplace and Poisson demonstrations of the probability theorem of the causes and, therefore, that the analysis of causal relations according to the postulates of the theory of the inversion of probability preceded its epistemological interpretation by two centuries. Likewise, it is demostrated that the presence of exogeneities consisting of rationally unjustifiable dogmatic principles in the field of the theory leads to hypocoded-creative abductions, which imply the negation of the selection rules suggested by Peirce and of the optimization criterion trough maximizing the likelihoods inherent in the theory of causal stochastic models.