关联交易中的政府资源配置:来自中国的证据

IF 2 4区管理学 Q3 BUSINESS

Australian Journal of Management Pub Date : 2023-11-09 DOI:10.1177/03128962231203520

Lu Wang, Jing Chi, Jing Liao

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文利用中国国有企业与政府非公司制机构之间的关联交易数据，研究了政府资源配置行为及其影响。我们发现，中国政府更有可能通过rpt将资源分配给具有政治关系的董事长的国有企业。考虑到内生性问题后，结果仍然稳健。在董事长有政治关系的国有企业中，通过rpt获得的资源除了增加投资支出外，与改善经济产出无关。此外，获得的资源与提高的劳动力成本粘性有关。我们的研究结果为中国政府与国有企业之间的政治交流提供了新的证据，这些交流是由有政治关系的高管促成的。JEL分类:G30、G38

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Government resource allocation through related party transactions: Evidence from China

Using unique hand-collected data of related party transactions (RPTs) between state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and government noncorporate agencies in China, we investigate the behavior of government resource allocation and its impacts. We find that Chinese governments are more likely to allocate resources to SOEs with a politically connected chairperson of the board through RPTs. The results remain robust after considering endogeneity concerns. In SOEs with a politically connected chairperson, resources obtained through RPTs are not associated with improved economic outputs except for increased investment expenditures. In addition, resources obtained are associated with improved labor cost stickiness. Our results add new evidence of the political exchange between Chinese governments and SOEs facilitated by politically connected executives. JEL Classification: G30, G38

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来源期刊

Australian Journal of Management Multiple-

CiteScore

10.60

自引率

4.20%

发文量

期刊介绍： The objectives of the Australian Journal of Management are to encourage and publish research in the field of management. The terms management and research are both broadly defined. The former includes the management of firms, groups, industries, regulatory bodies, government, and other institutions. The latter encompasses both discipline- and problem-based research. Consistent with the policy, the Australian Journal of Management publishes research in accounting, applied economics, finance, industrial relations, political science, psychology, statistics, and other disciplines, provided the application is to management, as well as research in areas such as marketing, corporate strategy, operations management, organisation development, decision analysis, and other problem-focuses paradigms.