The alienability of innovation: evidence from patent transfers

ABSTRACTThis paper examines the conceptualization of innovation as a public good using an empirical analysis of patent transfers. It proposes that patents make inventions both excludable and alienable, in contrast to secrecy which only makes them excludable. A survival analysis finds that 10% higher complexity of patent descriptions is associated with 9% higher patent transfer hazard. This suggests that inventors more often patent complex inventions for the alienability motive – as opposed to the excludability motive. Small inventors transfer their patents less likely, but they do so sooner than other inventors. This suggests that patents enable an exchange of inventions that would otherwise be kept secret, but small inventors may not benefit from this function disproportionately more than others. These findings have implications for the conceptualization of innovation.KEYWORDS: Innovationpatentssecrecyalienabilityexcludabilitypublic goods Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Appropriability defined as the ability to protect the firm's competitive advantage from its inventions in the prior three years (Cohen, Nelson, and Walsh Citation2000, p. 5).2 Arrow (Citation1962) generalizes the observation to information, while this paper focuses on innovation.3 Akcigit, Alp Celik, and Greenwood (Citation2016) model an extreme scenario where patented are not transferable. Although this is sub-optimal for patents, it is the case of some intellectual property rights. Copyright may not be re-sold in some countries (WIPO Citation2016). Regional agricultural indicators, such as those on the Parmigiano Reggiano cheese, may not be licensed or sold to producers outside a specific region (WTO Citation1994).4 Private email communication with the USPTO, available from the author upon request.5 For consistency, micro-entities, introduced in 2013, are treated as small entities (see USPTO Citation2020, for details).