用环境法规审计供应链:一种博弈论方法

IF 3.7 Q2 MANAGEMENT
Iman Ghalehkhondabi
{"title":"用环境法规审计供应链:一种博弈论方法","authors":"Iman Ghalehkhondabi","doi":"10.1080/16258312.2023.2265448","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe seriousness of climate change’s impact on people’s lives has compelled policymakers to create rules for businesses, aiming to limit their impact on the environment. Some companies decide to take the risk of breaking these rules instead of spending resources to follow them. In this study, we investigate the decision-making challenge that arises when a company interacts with a recycler. We expand the original model by including a second recycler. The company can decide to audit the recyclers or skip the audit and save resources. The recyclers can choose whether to follow environmental rules or not. The company wants to minimise costs, while the recyclers aim to maximise profits from recycling. We use game theory to represent how the company and the recyclers interact. The study’s findings reveal that adding the second recycler decreases the willingness of the first recycler to take risks and break environmental regulations.KEYWORDS: Supply chain managementgame theoryenvironmental regulationscircular economyincomplete data Disclosure statementThe author declare that they have no known conflict of interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.Notes1. Available at https://cen.acs.org/environment/sustainability/Companies-placing-big-bets-plastics/98/i392. Available at https://www.gobankingrates.com/money/business/companies-have-committed-to-reducing-waste-how-they-plan-to-do-it/3. Available at https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-electronic-waste-recycling-arrest-1220-biz-20161219-story.html4. Available at https://www.wastedive.com/news/progress-report-brands-recyclability-shareholder-lawsuits-esg/604425/","PeriodicalId":38158,"journal":{"name":"Supply Chain Forum","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Auditing a supply chain with environmental regulations: a game theory approach\",\"authors\":\"Iman Ghalehkhondabi\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/16258312.2023.2265448\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACTThe seriousness of climate change’s impact on people’s lives has compelled policymakers to create rules for businesses, aiming to limit their impact on the environment. Some companies decide to take the risk of breaking these rules instead of spending resources to follow them. In this study, we investigate the decision-making challenge that arises when a company interacts with a recycler. We expand the original model by including a second recycler. The company can decide to audit the recyclers or skip the audit and save resources. The recyclers can choose whether to follow environmental rules or not. The company wants to minimise costs, while the recyclers aim to maximise profits from recycling. We use game theory to represent how the company and the recyclers interact. The study’s findings reveal that adding the second recycler decreases the willingness of the first recycler to take risks and break environmental regulations.KEYWORDS: Supply chain managementgame theoryenvironmental regulationscircular economyincomplete data Disclosure statementThe author declare that they have no known conflict of interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.Notes1. Available at https://cen.acs.org/environment/sustainability/Companies-placing-big-bets-plastics/98/i392. Available at https://www.gobankingrates.com/money/business/companies-have-committed-to-reducing-waste-how-they-plan-to-do-it/3. Available at https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-electronic-waste-recycling-arrest-1220-biz-20161219-story.html4. Available at https://www.wastedive.com/news/progress-report-brands-recyclability-shareholder-lawsuits-esg/604425/\",\"PeriodicalId\":38158,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Supply Chain Forum\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.7000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Supply Chain Forum\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/16258312.2023.2265448\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"MANAGEMENT\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Supply Chain Forum","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/16258312.2023.2265448","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"MANAGEMENT","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

气候变化对人们生活影响的严重性迫使决策者为企业制定规则,旨在限制其对环境的影响。一些公司决定冒着违反这些规则的风险,而不是花费资源来遵守这些规则。在本研究中,我们调查了当公司与回收商互动时出现的决策挑战。我们扩展了原来的模型,增加了第二个回收器。公司可以决定对回收商进行审核或跳过审核以节省资源。回收者可以选择是否遵守环保规定。该公司希望将成本降至最低,而回收商的目标是从回收中获得最大利润。我们用博弈论来表示公司和回收者是如何互动的。研究结果表明,增加第二个回收者会降低第一个回收者承担风险和违反环境法规的意愿。关键词:供应链管理博弈论环境法规循环经济不完全数据披露声明作者声明他们没有已知的利益冲突或个人关系,这些利益冲突或个人关系可能会影响本文所报道的工作。可在https://cen.acs.org/environment/sustainability/Companies-placing-big-bets-plastics/98/i392获得。可在https://www.gobankingrates.com/money/business/companies-have-committed-to-reducing-waste-how-they-plan-to-do-it/3获得。可在https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-electronic-waste-recycling-arrest-1220-biz-20161219-story.html4获得。可在https://www.wastedive.com/news/progress-report-brands-recyclability-shareholder-lawsuits-esg/604425/下载
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Auditing a supply chain with environmental regulations: a game theory approach
ABSTRACTThe seriousness of climate change’s impact on people’s lives has compelled policymakers to create rules for businesses, aiming to limit their impact on the environment. Some companies decide to take the risk of breaking these rules instead of spending resources to follow them. In this study, we investigate the decision-making challenge that arises when a company interacts with a recycler. We expand the original model by including a second recycler. The company can decide to audit the recyclers or skip the audit and save resources. The recyclers can choose whether to follow environmental rules or not. The company wants to minimise costs, while the recyclers aim to maximise profits from recycling. We use game theory to represent how the company and the recyclers interact. The study’s findings reveal that adding the second recycler decreases the willingness of the first recycler to take risks and break environmental regulations.KEYWORDS: Supply chain managementgame theoryenvironmental regulationscircular economyincomplete data Disclosure statementThe author declare that they have no known conflict of interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.Notes1. Available at https://cen.acs.org/environment/sustainability/Companies-placing-big-bets-plastics/98/i392. Available at https://www.gobankingrates.com/money/business/companies-have-committed-to-reducing-waste-how-they-plan-to-do-it/3. Available at https://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-electronic-waste-recycling-arrest-1220-biz-20161219-story.html4. Available at https://www.wastedive.com/news/progress-report-brands-recyclability-shareholder-lawsuits-esg/604425/
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
Supply Chain Forum
Supply Chain Forum Business, Management and Accounting-Business and International Management
CiteScore
8.30
自引率
0.00%
发文量
34
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信