忠实或无畏:董事及管理人员责任保险与管理层讨论分析语气操纵

IF 1.4 4区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2023-06-20 DOI:10.1080/16081625.2023.2225536

Yi Ru, Wei Zhao, Zihao Su

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们考察了董事和高级管理人员责任保险(D&O保险)是否影响管理人员的战略语气操纵的管理层讨论和分析。我们发现D&O保险与向上音调操纵正相关。这种关联在诉讼风险较大的公司或高动机和过度自信的经理中更为明显。此外，我们记录了更有利的短期回报和密集的逆转，以响应D&O保险公司发布的积极基调。此外，受D&O保险保护的经理可能会通过减少风险因素信息披露来夸大语气。总的来说，我们的研究结果支持董事责任保险可以通过减少经理预期的个人法律责任来触发他们不道德的操纵行为。

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Faithful or fearless: directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and management discussion and analysis tone manipulation

We examine whether directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) influences managers’ strategic tone manipulation of management discussion and analysis. We find that D&O insurance is positively associated with upward tone manipulation. This association is more pronounced for firms with greater litigation risk or highly-motivated and overconfident managers. Additionally, we document more favorable short-term returns and intensive reversals responding to positive tones issued by D&O insurance-covered firms. Besides, D&O insurance-shielded managers may inflate the tone by reducing risk-factor information disclosures. Overall, our results support that D&O insurance can trigger managers’ unethical manipulations by reducing their expected personal legal liability.

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来源期刊

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics (APJAE) is an international forum intended for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of economics and accounting in general. In particular, the journal encourages submissions in the following areas: Auditing, financial reporting, earnings management, financial analysts, the role of accounting information, international trade and finance, industrial organization, strategic behavior, market structure, financial contracts, corporate governance, capital markets, and financial institutions. The journal welcomes contributions related to the Asia Pacific region, and targets top quality research from scholars with diverse regional interests. The editors encourage submission of high quality manuscripts with innovative ideas. The editorial team is committed to an expedient review process.