“具身经验”的意义:对Anik Waldow著作的回应

IF 0.3 4区 哲学 N/A PHILOSOPHY
Hynek Janoušek
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Instead, Waldow shows that the main philosophers of the time understood experience and reason in a broader way and that not only the content of the concept, but also the angle from which experience was considered was not purely theoretical but moral and practical—and this, in turn, led them into researching experience as embodied experience. Indeed, on the one hand, according to most of these theories, our experience is born of a response to the causal action of the external environment on our body and of the body itself; on the other hand, the bodily subject of experience experiences herself as a being who actively and reasonably acts in the world and transforms it. We are aware of this active role.1 Since, in this period of philosophy, a fact is defined as that which is given to us by experience, and our bodily actions in the world are given to us in this way, our corporeality, and our action through it, are facts that must somehow be brought into harmony. However, man does not experience herself only as a machine mechanically bound to the sensory stimuli of her own body, but as an active agent who can use her reason and will to shape her life and the world in which she lives. But does man still really possess a reason and a will of her own, which distinguish her actions from the instinctive actions of animals, and which allow her to distance herself from immediate [End Page 305] sensory affects and to act? How can reason and will be interpreted in the context of an embodied and causally determined human experience? And if human moral determination points to self-determined and responsible action, and if this possibility is acquired through learning and education, what kind of self-determining reason are we talking about?2 Finally, the question is how society should shape experience of its individuals so that they can develop their reason and thus the possibility of self-determined action. Waldow chooses the works of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and Herder to discuss these topics. The book thus covers authors of all three major linguistic areas in early modern philosophy. The text of the book is divided into three sections. The first discusses Descartes and Locke and the moral dimension of human experience. The second focuses on Hume, Rousseau, and Herder and the question of how the development of our higher cognitive and affective faculties is conditioned by affective responses to sense perception. In the third section, Waldow addresses the question of how the empirical science of man (anthropology) is understood in the work of Herder and Kant. The book starts with a chapter on Descartes, based primarily on an interpretation of his Meditations on First Philosophy. It is clear that in Cartesian methodological skepticism the meditator experiences a freedom to abstain from judging based on confused ideas. Meditations thus allow her to experience the active use of her own mind. This experience contrasts with the passive emergence of sensory ideas and concepts. In the conclusion of the Meditations, this passivity is interpreted as the soul’s experience of being embodied in a bodily substance. In contrast, the experience of the free use of our judgment is a practical experience leading to the development of the ability to actively follow truth and direct the will not only in theoretical inquiry but also in the control of our passions. This is very important for Descartes, for this experience is essential for a virtuous and happy human life. 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That topic is the question of how the concepts of embodied experience and reason were understood in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century philosophy. This problem, according to Waldow, is often treated too narrowly, namely by concentrating on the problems of the theory of knowledge. Instead, Waldow shows that the main philosophers of the time understood experience and reason in a broader way and that not only the content of the concept, but also the angle from which experience was considered was not purely theoretical but moral and practical—and this, in turn, led them into researching experience as embodied experience. Indeed, on the one hand, according to most of these theories, our experience is born of a response to the causal action of the external environment on our body and of the body itself; on the other hand, the bodily subject of experience experiences herself as a being who actively and reasonably acts in the world and transforms it. We are aware of this active role.1 Since, in this period of philosophy, a fact is defined as that which is given to us by experience, and our bodily actions in the world are given to us in this way, our corporeality, and our action through it, are facts that must somehow be brought into harmony. However, man does not experience herself only as a machine mechanically bound to the sensory stimuli of her own body, but as an active agent who can use her reason and will to shape her life and the world in which she lives. But does man still really possess a reason and a will of her own, which distinguish her actions from the instinctive actions of animals, and which allow her to distance herself from immediate [End Page 305] sensory affects and to act? How can reason and will be interpreted in the context of an embodied and causally determined human experience? And if human moral determination points to self-determined and responsible action, and if this possibility is acquired through learning and education, what kind of self-determining reason are we talking about?2 Finally, the question is how society should shape experience of its individuals so that they can develop their reason and thus the possibility of self-determined action. Waldow chooses the works of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and Herder to discuss these topics. The book thus covers authors of all three major linguistic areas in early modern philosophy. The text of the book is divided into three sections. The first discusses Descartes and Locke and the moral dimension of human experience. The second focuses on Hume, Rousseau, and Herder and the question of how the development of our higher cognitive and affective faculties is conditioned by affective responses to sense perception. In the third section, Waldow addresses the question of how the empirical science of man (anthropology) is understood in the work of Herder and Kant. The book starts with a chapter on Descartes, based primarily on an interpretation of his Meditations on First Philosophy. It is clear that in Cartesian methodological skepticism the meditator experiences a freedom to abstain from judging based on confused ideas. Meditations thus allow her to experience the active use of her own mind. This experience contrasts with the passive emergence of sensory ideas and concepts. In the conclusion of the Meditations, this passivity is interpreted as the soul’s experience of being embodied in a bodily substance. In contrast, the experience of the free use of our judgment is a practical experience leading to the development of the ability to actively follow truth and direct the will not only in theoretical inquiry but also in the control of our passions. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

“体现经验”的意义:对Anik Waldow的书Hynek Janoušek(生物)Anik Waldow,经验体现:人类在自然中的位置的早期现代描述Anik Waldow的书,经验体现:人类在自然中的位置的早期现代描述,是一个值得广泛讨论的有趣话题的受欢迎的贡献。这个主题是17和18世纪哲学中具体经验和理性的概念是如何被理解的问题。根据沃尔多的观点,这个问题通常被过于狭隘地对待,即只关注知识理论的问题。相反,沃尔多表明,当时的主要哲学家以更广泛的方式理解经验和理性,不仅概念的内容,而且考虑经验的角度也不是纯粹的理论,而是道德和实践——这反过来又引导他们将经验作为具体化的经验来研究。的确,一方面,根据大多数这些理论,我们的经验产生于外部环境对我们身体和身体本身的因果作用的反应;另一方面,经验的身体主体将自己体验为一个积极合理地在世界中行动并改造世界的存在。我们意识到这一积极作用因为在这个哲学时期,事实被定义为经验给予我们的东西,而我们在世界上的身体活动也是这样给予我们的,所以我们的肉体性和我们通过肉体的活动,都是必须以某种方式调和起来的事实。然而,男人并不仅仅把自己当作一台机器,机械地束缚在自己身体的感官刺激上,而是把自己当作一个能动的能动者,可以用她的理性和意志来塑造她的生活和她所生活的世界。但是,人是否真的还拥有自己的理性和意志,使她的行为区别于动物的本能行为,使她能够远离直接的感官影响而采取行动呢?在具体的和因果决定的人类经验的背景下,如何解释理性和意志?如果人类的道德决定指向自我决定和负责任的行为,如果这种可能性是通过学习和教育获得的,我们谈论的是哪种自我决定的理性?最后,问题是社会应如何塑造个人的经验,使他们能够发展理性,从而有可能采取自主行动。沃尔多选择了笛卡尔、洛克、休谟、卢梭、康德和赫尔德的作品来讨论这些话题。因此,这本书涵盖了早期现代哲学中所有三个主要语言领域的作者。这本书的正文分为三个部分。第一部分讨论了笛卡尔和洛克以及人类经验的道德维度。第二部分关注的是休谟、卢梭和赫尔德,以及我们的高级认知和情感能力的发展如何受到对感官知觉的情感反应的制约。在第三部分,沃尔多提出了在赫尔德和康德的著作中如何理解人类的经验科学(人类学)的问题。这本书以笛卡尔的一章开篇,主要是基于对他的第一哲学沉思的解释。很明显,在笛卡尔的方法论怀疑主义中,冥想者体验到一种自由,可以放弃基于混乱观念的判断。因此,冥想可以让她体验到积极运用自己的思想。这种体验与感官观念和概念的被动出现形成对比。在《沉思录》的结论中,这种被动性被解释为灵魂被肉体所体现的体验。相比之下,自由运用我们的判断的经验是一种实践经验,它不仅在理论探索中,而且在控制我们的激情中,引导我们积极地追随真理和指导意志的能力的发展。这对笛卡尔来说是非常重要的,因为这种体验对于一个有美德和幸福的人类生活是必不可少的。关于洛克的那一章继续讨论……
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Meanings of “Embodied Experience”: A Response to Anik Waldow’s Book
Meanings of “Embodied Experience”: A Response to Anik Waldow’s Book Hynek Janoušek (bio) Anik Waldow, Experience Embodied: Early Modern Accounts of the Human Place in Nature Anik Waldow’s book, Experience Embodied: Early Modern Accounts of Human Place in Nature, is a welcome contribution to an interesting topic worthy of wider discussion. That topic is the question of how the concepts of embodied experience and reason were understood in seventeenth-and eighteenth-century philosophy. This problem, according to Waldow, is often treated too narrowly, namely by concentrating on the problems of the theory of knowledge. Instead, Waldow shows that the main philosophers of the time understood experience and reason in a broader way and that not only the content of the concept, but also the angle from which experience was considered was not purely theoretical but moral and practical—and this, in turn, led them into researching experience as embodied experience. Indeed, on the one hand, according to most of these theories, our experience is born of a response to the causal action of the external environment on our body and of the body itself; on the other hand, the bodily subject of experience experiences herself as a being who actively and reasonably acts in the world and transforms it. We are aware of this active role.1 Since, in this period of philosophy, a fact is defined as that which is given to us by experience, and our bodily actions in the world are given to us in this way, our corporeality, and our action through it, are facts that must somehow be brought into harmony. However, man does not experience herself only as a machine mechanically bound to the sensory stimuli of her own body, but as an active agent who can use her reason and will to shape her life and the world in which she lives. But does man still really possess a reason and a will of her own, which distinguish her actions from the instinctive actions of animals, and which allow her to distance herself from immediate [End Page 305] sensory affects and to act? How can reason and will be interpreted in the context of an embodied and causally determined human experience? And if human moral determination points to self-determined and responsible action, and if this possibility is acquired through learning and education, what kind of self-determining reason are we talking about?2 Finally, the question is how society should shape experience of its individuals so that they can develop their reason and thus the possibility of self-determined action. Waldow chooses the works of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Kant, and Herder to discuss these topics. The book thus covers authors of all three major linguistic areas in early modern philosophy. The text of the book is divided into three sections. The first discusses Descartes and Locke and the moral dimension of human experience. The second focuses on Hume, Rousseau, and Herder and the question of how the development of our higher cognitive and affective faculties is conditioned by affective responses to sense perception. In the third section, Waldow addresses the question of how the empirical science of man (anthropology) is understood in the work of Herder and Kant. The book starts with a chapter on Descartes, based primarily on an interpretation of his Meditations on First Philosophy. It is clear that in Cartesian methodological skepticism the meditator experiences a freedom to abstain from judging based on confused ideas. Meditations thus allow her to experience the active use of her own mind. This experience contrasts with the passive emergence of sensory ideas and concepts. In the conclusion of the Meditations, this passivity is interpreted as the soul’s experience of being embodied in a bodily substance. In contrast, the experience of the free use of our judgment is a practical experience leading to the development of the ability to actively follow truth and direct the will not only in theoretical inquiry but also in the control of our passions. This is very important for Descartes, for this experience is essential for a virtuous and happy human life. The chapter on Locke continues with a discussion of the activation of...
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