Mpox暴露在一个集中的住院精神病学单位:调查和结果的描述-纽约市,2022年

Waleed Malik, Justin Chan, Simon Dosovitz, Clyde Gilmore, Jeanne Cosico
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引用次数: 0

摘要

背景:2022年5月,纽约市(NYC)经历了一次大规模的人类痘(分支IIb)暴发。在非流行环境的卫生保健设施中接触m痘后传播的数据有限。由于纽约市以前未见过mpox,我们的医护人员可能并不总是识别疑似病例,因此可能忽视及时实施感染预防和控制措施,导致感染暴露。在精神科住院病人中,未被识别的mpox传播的风险可能更高,因为在病人的公共空间环境中,直接身体接触更为常见。2022年7月,一名患者被送往纽约市卫生+医院-贝尔维尤(贝尔维尤)精神科,其m痘体征和症状在4天内未被识别出来,此时对该患者进行了m痘检测并进行了隔离。我们描述了在诊断和隔离指示患者之前4天内对暴露的工作人员和患者的调查,并报告了暴露者中m痘感染的结果。方法:本研究对纽约市最大的市立医院贝尔维尤(Bellevue)的mpox患者住院精神科的成年患者和工作人员进行回顾性图表回顾。根据疾病预防控制中心的标准,对每个人的暴露程度进行分类,并在有需要的情况下提供暴露后的痘疫苗接种。对于高危接触者,我们描述与患者接触的性质。关注的结果是在最后一次接触后21天内发生m痘感染。结果:共有29名患者和84名工作人员被确定在分离麻疹指示病例之前曾住在精神科。在最后一次接触后的21天内监测所有接触者的m痘体征和症状。暴露的病人和未暴露的病人被隔离在精神病病房。所有有过接触的患者都被归类为低至中等风险暴露。在23名受到接触的工作人员中,8人有高风险接触,4人有中等风险接触,11人有低风险接触。高风险暴露者被提供Jynneos作为暴露后疫苗接种,但他们拒绝了。在随访期间,没有暴露的工作人员或患者发生m痘。结论:尽管在集中精神病学单位多次接触,但未观察到Mpox传播。鉴于有限的数据,需要进一步的研究来更好地了解集中医疗保健环境中的传播风险。披露:没有
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mpox exposure on a congregate inpatient psychiatry unit: Description of the investigation and outcomes—New York City, 2022
Background: In May 2022, New York City (NYC) experienced a large outbreak of human mpox (clade IIb). Data on mpox transmission following exposure in healthcare facilities in nonendemic settings are limited. Because mpox was previously not seen in NYC, our healthcare staff may not always recognize a suspected case and therefore may neglect to implement timely infection prevention and control measures, leading to infectious exposures. The risk of transmission from unrecognized mpox may be higher in inpatient psychiatric units where direct physical contact is more common in the setting of common spaces for patients. In July 2022, a patient was admitted to NYC Health + Hospitals–Bellevue (Bellevue) psychiatry with signs and symptoms of mpox that were not recognized for 4 days, at which point the patient was tested for mpox and was isolated. We describe the investigation of staff and patients exposed during the 4 days prior to diagnosis and isolation of the index patient, and we report on the outcome mpox infection among those exposed. Methods: This study was a retrospective chart review of adult patients admitted to and staff working on an inpatient psychiatric unit where the patient with mpox was admitted to Bellevue, the largest municipal hospital in NYC. Each individual was classified regarding degree of exposure, based on criteria from the CDC, and was offered postexposure mpox vaccination where indicated. We describe the nature of contact with the patient for those with high-risk exposures. The outcome of interest was development of mpox infection during 21 days after last exposure. Results: In total, 29 patients and 84 staff members were identified to have been on the psychiatric unit prior to isolation of the index case of mpox. All exposed individuals were monitored for signs and symptoms of mpox for 21 days after last exposure. The exposed and unexposed patients were kept apart in the psychiatric unit. All patients who had contact were classified as having a low-to-intermediate risk exposure. Among 23 staff members exposed, 8 had high-risk exposures, 4 had intermediate-risk exposures, and 11 had low-risk exposures. Those with high-risk exposures were offered Jynneos as postexposure vaccination, but they declined. None of the exposed staff or patients developed mpox during the follow-up period. Conclusions: Mpox transmission was not observed despite several exposures in a congregate psychiatry unit. Given limited data, further studies are needed to better understand transmission risk in congregate healthcare settings. Disclosures: None
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