Boundaries and varieties of republicanism

ABSTRACTThis paper addresses a neglected question in republican political philosophy: what are the conditions for a set of arguments to be considered republican? While republicanism traditionally confers a fundamental role to the democratic ideal of participation in decision-making, recent contributions argue that freedom could be promoted by facilitating exit where possible. The strong version of the latter argument states that when exit is possible, it constitutes the most important contribution to republican freedom, and it preserves the goal of isolating individual choices, i.e. it precludes collective decision-making from interfering with them, and so it intends to limit the scope of public concern considered legitimate. I examine this argument to discuss the boundaries and varieties of republicanism: (i) the boundaries establish that an argument should be couched and substantively articulated in distinctively republican terms; (ii) the strong version of the exit argument does not fall within the boundaries because it is in tension with core republican commitments to self-government and civic virtues; (iii) once we abide by the boundaries we may encounter a diversity of proposals differing on the more concrete level of institutional design and empirical assumptions – these are the varieties of republicanism.KEYWORDS: Republicanismfreedomvirtuedemocracyliberalism AcknowledgementPrevious versions of this paper were presented in Louvain (Chaire Hoover d’éthique économique et sociale), Pavia, and Braga. I am also grateful to Iñigo González-Ricoy, José Luis Martí, Rubén Marciel, Luke Newberry and the anonymous reviewer for their comments.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. By ‘classical liberalism’ (Freeman, Citation2011; De Dijn, Citation2020, pt. 3) I mean the political tradition that builds its core normative requirements around a defence of private property and related ‘economic freedoms’, including thinkers like Constant, Paley, Guizot, Mises, Hayek or Friedman.2. I do not elaborate on cases that may break this general claim, such as increasing our power by being dependent on other agents on which we rely on collective action, or diminishing our power due to collective action problems produced by exit and uncoordinated choices.3. Taylor highlights that the exit view relies on market-coordinated individual preferences rather than collective decisions or bureaucratic discretion (Taylor, Citation2017, pp. 46–49). Lovett initially considered that introducing a basic income involves a strong reform program in the economic sphere, so that it ‘would replace most other public welfare programs, and eliminate the need for much workplace regulation and the minimum wage’ (Lovett, Citation2010, p. 199). Now, he seems more cautious about introducing a more plural institutional design. He stresses the need to curb economic inequality, the empirically determined nature of institutional design and the possibility of a complementary rather than substitutive role for exit measures in the economic sphere (Lovett, Citation2022, p. 118). Section 3 elaborates on further distinctions between Taylor and Lovett.4. We can appreciate an evolution from his earlier work. There, Lovett highlighted that external constraints, like effective rule of law, render power not arbitrary (Lovett, Citation2010, p. 111). Also, he mentioned civic virtue concerning compliance with the law and government oversight when using ballots rather than focusing on its role for a contestatory citizenry (Lovett, Citation2010, p. 216).5. Arguably, some minimal degree of ‘realism’ or non-ideal characterization of politics, as reflected in discussions about power asymmetries and institutional controls, could be part of the core republican commitments (see Pettit, Citation2017).6. We could propose a more flexible version in which the cornerstone of the theory is (1) a reciprocal relation between freedom and virtue. For this paper, and considering the prevalent contemporary interpretation, I will assume the wording of the main text.7. ‘Thicker’ or Aristotelian views of civic virtues value the display of virtue in itself (Pocock, Citation1981; Schwarzenbach, Citation1996), while the ‘thinner’ less perfectionist versions expressed by Pettit (Citation1997) and Skinner (Citation2011) treat it as a functional requirement for freedom. Also, in the Aristotelian view, virtues are certain character traits, while on the thin version that I endorse here, virtues are dispositions that contribute to promoting and assuring the equal status of republican freedom.8. Technically speaking, republicans are motivational pluralists. Recent behavioural science has contested the explanatory primacy of self-interest, arguing that we find a plurality of motivations in human behaviour (Bowles, Citation2016; Frey, Citation1997; Gintis et al., Citation2005; Ostrom, Citation2000). Side by side with self-interest we find intrinsic motivations or social preferences —like reciprocity, commitment, or sympathy—, by which we also place a value both on others’ welfare or interests and on how we relate to them.9. There is an interesting experiment by Falk and Szech (Citation2013) that gives support to the crowding out thesis. In the experiment, the subjects decided between receiving money or saving the life of a mouse in different settings. The study compared the scenario of a person being asked the choice by the interviewers with the scenarios of bilateral and multilateral bargains with other subjects. They discovered that subjects are more prone to accept the killing of the mouse if the decision is taken in a bargain with others (especially in multilateral bargains).10. Civic education is widely acknowledged as a central part of republican thought. Not to mention ancient paideia, it figures notoriously in Rousseau’s writings. I do not focus on this means to create virtue. My point is that the link between institutions and motivations goes beyond civic education and relates to the other aspects I mention, especially the connection between voice and virtue.Additional informationFundingThis work has benefited from an AGAUR FI grant and has been part of the research project “Justice and work: a normative analysis of non-standard work” funded by the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation and Universities.Notes on contributorsAdrián HerranzAdrián Herranz is a PhD candidate at Pompeu Fabra University. His research interests include republican political philosophy, economic democracy, labour relations and social theory related to the former topics.