{"title":"国会角色会影响游说活动吗?来自加拿大下议院的证据","authors":"Maxime Boucher, Alex Marland","doi":"10.1080/01900692.2023.2256489","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTIn parliamentary systems, private members (i.e. backbenchers) with formal titles and roles can affect the institutional system in which politicians, civil servants and interest groups are embedded. Packing legislative institutions with backbenchers who act as agents of the government but who are not in Cabinet puts certain Members of Parliament in a privileged position with the core executive. We hypothesize that influential positions in Canada’s House of Commons, notably a parliamentary secretary tasked with supporting a minister or a chair of a parliamentary committee, bring increased external pressure from interest group lobbyists. We test these assumptions with data on communications between MPs and interest group lobbyists gathered from the federal Registry of Lobbyists and open data lists found on the website of the Parliament of Canada. Our results show that a parliamentary secretary position or a seat on a standard committee exposes MPs to higher lobbying volumes.Keywords: Parliamentary secretaryparliamentary committeebackbencherlobbyingexecutive branch Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The Salaries Act specifies the number of parliamentary secretaries (sec. 46.2 Parliament of Canada Act, Citation2019). Under Justin Trudeau, the number is synonymous with the number of Cabinet ministers, excluding ministers without portfolios.2. Figures obtained online for cabinet (https://pm.gc.ca/en/cabinet), parliamentary secretaries (https://pm.gc.ca/en/parliamentary-secretaries) and committee members (https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/List) on March 5, 2022.3. We exclude committee of the whole which is the entire membership of the legislature minus the Speaker.4. see 106(2) in House of Commons 2021.5. As stated on the website of the Office of Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada: “The Lobbyists Registration Regulations prescribe the types of communications that must be reported in a monthly report as ‘oral and arranged communications excluding oral and arranged communications initiated by public office holders related to the development of policy, programs or legislation.’ In-house and consultant lobbyists must report all oral and arranged communications relating to financial benefits, even when initiated by a public officer holder. Likewise, consultant lobbyists must report oral and arranged communications relating to a contract regardless of who initiated the communication.” For more details on lobbying disclosure rules: https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/en/rules/the-lobbying-act/advice-and-interpretation-lobbying-act/communicating-with-designated-public-office-holders/.6. We do not control for MPs who served during prorogation, which shuts down committee work.","PeriodicalId":47833,"journal":{"name":"INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION","volume":"60 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":1.8000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do Parliamentary Roles Affect Lobbying Activities? 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We test these assumptions with data on communications between MPs and interest group lobbyists gathered from the federal Registry of Lobbyists and open data lists found on the website of the Parliament of Canada. Our results show that a parliamentary secretary position or a seat on a standard committee exposes MPs to higher lobbying volumes.Keywords: Parliamentary secretaryparliamentary committeebackbencherlobbyingexecutive branch Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The Salaries Act specifies the number of parliamentary secretaries (sec. 46.2 Parliament of Canada Act, Citation2019). Under Justin Trudeau, the number is synonymous with the number of Cabinet ministers, excluding ministers without portfolios.2. Figures obtained online for cabinet (https://pm.gc.ca/en/cabinet), parliamentary secretaries (https://pm.gc.ca/en/parliamentary-secretaries) and committee members (https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/List) on March 5, 2022.3. We exclude committee of the whole which is the entire membership of the legislature minus the Speaker.4. see 106(2) in House of Commons 2021.5. As stated on the website of the Office of Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada: “The Lobbyists Registration Regulations prescribe the types of communications that must be reported in a monthly report as ‘oral and arranged communications excluding oral and arranged communications initiated by public office holders related to the development of policy, programs or legislation.’ In-house and consultant lobbyists must report all oral and arranged communications relating to financial benefits, even when initiated by a public officer holder. Likewise, consultant lobbyists must report oral and arranged communications relating to a contract regardless of who initiated the communication.” For more details on lobbying disclosure rules: https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/en/rules/the-lobbying-act/advice-and-interpretation-lobbying-act/communicating-with-designated-public-office-holders/.6. 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引用次数: 0
摘要
在议会制度中,拥有正式头衔和角色的私人议员(即后座议员)可以影响政治家、公务员和利益集团所嵌入的制度体系。立法机构中充斥着充当政府代理人但不属于内阁的后座议员,这使得某些国会议员与核心行政人员处于特权地位。我们假设,加拿大下议院中有影响力的职位,特别是负责支持部长或议会委员会主席的议会秘书,会增加利益集团游说者的外部压力。我们从联邦游说者登记处和加拿大议会网站上的公开数据列表中收集了国会议员和利益集团游说者之间的沟通数据,对这些假设进行了检验。我们的研究结果表明,议会秘书职位或标准委员会的席位使国会议员面临更高的游说量。关键词:议会秘书议会委员会后座议员游说行政部门披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。《薪俸法》规定了议会秘书的人数(《加拿大议会法》第46.2条,Citation2019)。在贾斯汀·特鲁多(Justin Trudeau)的领导下,这个数字与内阁部长人数同义,不包括没有职位的部长。3月5日,国务委员(https://pm.gc.ca/en/cabinet)、政务秘书官(https://pm.gc.ca/en/parliamentary-secretaries)、委员会委员(https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/List)的数据已在网上公开。我们排除全体委员会,即立法机关的全体成员减去议长。参见下议院2021.5第106(2)条。正如加拿大游说专员办公室(Office of Commissioner of lobby of Canada)网站上所述:“游说者登记条例规定,必须在月度报告中报告的沟通类型为‘口头和安排的沟通’,不包括与政策、项目或立法制定有关的公职人员发起的口头和安排的沟通。”内部游说者和顾问游说者必须报告所有与经济利益有关的口头和安排沟通,即使是由公职人员发起的。同样,顾问游说者必须报告与合同有关的口头和安排沟通,无论沟通是由谁发起的。”欲了解更多有关游说公开规定的详情,请访问:https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/en/rules/the-lobbying-act/advice-and-interpretation-lobbying-act/communicating-with-designated-public-office-holders/.6。我们不控制那些在休会期间任职的议员,这导致委员会的工作中断。
Do Parliamentary Roles Affect Lobbying Activities? Evidence from the Canadian House of Commons
ABSTRACTIn parliamentary systems, private members (i.e. backbenchers) with formal titles and roles can affect the institutional system in which politicians, civil servants and interest groups are embedded. Packing legislative institutions with backbenchers who act as agents of the government but who are not in Cabinet puts certain Members of Parliament in a privileged position with the core executive. We hypothesize that influential positions in Canada’s House of Commons, notably a parliamentary secretary tasked with supporting a minister or a chair of a parliamentary committee, bring increased external pressure from interest group lobbyists. We test these assumptions with data on communications between MPs and interest group lobbyists gathered from the federal Registry of Lobbyists and open data lists found on the website of the Parliament of Canada. Our results show that a parliamentary secretary position or a seat on a standard committee exposes MPs to higher lobbying volumes.Keywords: Parliamentary secretaryparliamentary committeebackbencherlobbyingexecutive branch Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. The Salaries Act specifies the number of parliamentary secretaries (sec. 46.2 Parliament of Canada Act, Citation2019). Under Justin Trudeau, the number is synonymous with the number of Cabinet ministers, excluding ministers without portfolios.2. Figures obtained online for cabinet (https://pm.gc.ca/en/cabinet), parliamentary secretaries (https://pm.gc.ca/en/parliamentary-secretaries) and committee members (https://www.ourcommons.ca/Committees/en/List) on March 5, 2022.3. We exclude committee of the whole which is the entire membership of the legislature minus the Speaker.4. see 106(2) in House of Commons 2021.5. As stated on the website of the Office of Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada: “The Lobbyists Registration Regulations prescribe the types of communications that must be reported in a monthly report as ‘oral and arranged communications excluding oral and arranged communications initiated by public office holders related to the development of policy, programs or legislation.’ In-house and consultant lobbyists must report all oral and arranged communications relating to financial benefits, even when initiated by a public officer holder. Likewise, consultant lobbyists must report oral and arranged communications relating to a contract regardless of who initiated the communication.” For more details on lobbying disclosure rules: https://lobbycanada.gc.ca/en/rules/the-lobbying-act/advice-and-interpretation-lobbying-act/communicating-with-designated-public-office-holders/.6. We do not control for MPs who served during prorogation, which shuts down committee work.
期刊介绍:
IJPA is an international, research-driven, and peer-reviewed publication aimed at exploring the latest developments in public administration, public policy, and management – translating theory for practice and practice into theory. IJPA is a truly global journal in scope, covering developed, emerging and transitional states, nonprofit and nongovernmental organizations, and all areas of public activity. We welcome theoretical, analytical, quantitative, qualitative, empirical, and practitioner-based, as well as individual country-based, region-based, and especially comparative works. Our target audience is not just scholars, but also policy-makers and practitioners, including aspiring public sector leaders engaged in education and research in the growing global public service, policy, and administration, and governance community.