English commercial ascendancy and the growth in competition for Baltic markets, 1650–1700

ABSTRACTFrom the 1650s the expansion of English interests in the Baltic fostered more competition for access to commercial markets. A desire from Sweden to meet its own commercial goals also led to a greater level of competition for shipping. An increasing association between England and Sweden brought about the greatest commercial shift in Baltic commerce during that century. Building on research that has established general trends in Anglo-Baltic commercial history during the period, this article assesses the growth and competition of English commercial ambition. The article consults data sets such as the Sound Toll Registers Online, and the Stockholm customs accounts, while taking into consideration contemporary diplomatic sources. It seeks to answer why, how and where English trade became competitive in the Baltic. It outlines general commercial flows by juxtaposing England’s shipping next to its nearest competitors and consults three case studies to reveal previously unrealised nuances in Anglo-Baltic trade.KEYWORDS: EnglandSwedenBaltictradeearly modernJEL CODES: F02F14F36N43P45 Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 TNA, CO 389/15, 14 July 1696.2 I would like to thank Jan Willem Veluwenkamp for pointing me in the direction of the former study.3 It must be said that in such a broad and detailed study Åström did touch on aspects of Anglo-Dutch competition for markets in the Baltic but was perhaps limited by spatial considerations to warrant a detailed appraisal (Åström, Citation1963, pp. 61–68).4 It is important to appreciate that the English and Scottish commercial spheres were distinctive jurisdictional entities. In practice the two spheres remained separate with very little collaboration occurring in Baltic trade between the two nations. For a history of Scottish commercial organisation in the early part of the century consult (McLoughlin, Citation2013).5 A brief sketch of developments in the Swedish iron industry in the context of western exports during the seventeenth century occurs in Chris Evans and Göran Rydén’s study. However, this study of the Anglo-Swedish iron trade focuses on the 1700s and not its foundation the century prior (Evans & Rydén, Citation2007).6 A key exception would be Henry Roseveare’s research during the 1990s which incorporated the exploits of the Marescoe-David commercial house in the Baltic (Roseveare, Citation1991).7 For current debates surrounding the Sound Toll Registers see: (Degn, Citation2017). For more information on how the STRO functions in practice consult: Scheltjens, Veluwenkamp, & van der Woude, Citation2018). Although the STRO have provided unparalleled access to the Sound Toll Registers it is important for researchers to familiarise themselves with the latter article for practical and contextual reasons. As a supplement to the introductory chapter, which acts as an invaluable methodological guide to aid future research, the edited volume to which this article belongs has done much to demonstrate the potential for further research permitted through the online accessibility of the Sound Toll Registers, particularly for historians of the eighteenth century. Not only are a wide variety of geographical areas consulted but comparative, source critical aspects of the volume in particular have provided this study with influential frameworks to consider.8 I am extremely grateful for the Sound Toll Registers Online project for undertaking the monumental task of digitising the Sound Toll Registers and making it a free, open access source of which this research would not have been made possible without. I would also like to thank Dr Cathleen Sarti who kindly brought this source to my attention.9 Israel has stated a number of reasons for Dutch decline in the Baltic. War, changing commodity structures in their carrying trade, and the commercial stance propelled by Sweden, among other factors. Ormrod saw structural contractions in Dutch eastward trades from the 1640s as playing a role in declining share of Baltic shipping. This was coupled with proactive policies on the part of the English designed to harm Dutch trade such as the Navigation Acts and successful seizures of shipping during their first conflict in the early 1650s (Israel, Citation1989, pp. 213–216; Ormrod, Citation2003, p. 273, 276, 278, 280). A full discussion related to factors relating to Dutch decline is not the focus of this study.10 STRO searches relating to home ports in the Dutch Republic, 1600–1700.11 Other factors also contributed that led to the widespread crash of the Dutch economy (Israel, Citation1989, pp. 292–296). During such troughs particular attention has been paid to the potential for ‘false flagging’/‘outflagging’ or ‘colouring’ vessels whereby Dutch ships would mask their nationality with that of another. However, consultation of the home ports of ships listed in and cross referenced in both the STRO and SCA reveal that authorities both at the Sound and in Stockholm were aware of the origin and nationality of the vast majority of ships. During the mid-1670s the STRO reveal a spike in the number of Hamburger vessels passing the Sound, but how far this skews overall data on Dutch shipping at this point seems negligible. Henri Hannula has noted the prevalence of Hamburg ships in Swedish trade in the mid-1670s and the awareness of contemporaries to this practice (Hannula, Citation2023, p. 72); STRO searches related to Hamburger ships, 1670–1680; STRO searches related to home ports in the Dutch Republic, 1670–1680.12 Heckscher’s statistical estimations are based on decennial averages which can paint a misleading picture of Swedish shipping’s true extent in Baltic trade. (Heckscher, Citation1940, p. 16). Arguments surrounding the competitiveness of Swedish shipping against ‘British’ and heckschr Dutch alternatives for the 1670s – 80s are most detailed in Bjurling (Citation1971), although Heckscher does briefly consider shipping capacity (tonnage) as a competitive factor (Heckscher, Citation1936, pp. 561–564). Åström’s study of the impact of the English Navigation Laws on Baltic trading saw low tariffs applied to Swedish, and Swedish-Baltic shipping as one of the factors that increased the competitiveness of Swedish shipping (Åström, Citation1960, p. 12). How far this was offset with charges applied in English ports to Swedish vessels is difficult to establish due to the partial survival of English customs rolls and the legislative impact of Anglo-Swedish diplomatic treaties.13 Previous studies have agreed on the success of Swedish shipping during the 1690s in particular. See Åström (Citation1960), Bjurling (Citation1971) and Heckscher (Citation1940). Consultation of the Stockholm customs accounts reveals increases in Swedish shipping in foreign trade and within the Baltic itself from the 1660s, while Figure 1 also demonstrates a growing share of trade moving through the Sound from this period.14 For more detail see: Israel (Citation1989); van Tielhof (Citation2002); (Tjaden, Citation1994); Ormrod (Citation2003). Historians of English trade such as Charles Wilson saw the Dutch system as the foundation for English commercial legislation (Wilson, Citation1967, p. 164).15 Swedish historians such as Heckscher and Bjurling have seen drawbacks in comparing shipping based solely on the amount of ships and prefer to use overall capacity as a measurement as they state Dutch ships tended to be larger than their Swedish or British counterparts (Heckscher, Citation1936, p. 563; Bjurling, Citation1971, p. 6, 13).16 STRO search related to home ports for England and Wales; (Anderson, Citation1969, p. 72).17 STRO searches: Swedish home ports, 1665–1667 and 1672–1674; SSA, SCA, Vol. 29. 1666.18 In the face of Swedish competition during wartime over 1690s, Åström anticipated that, while supply lines were kept open between England and Sweden, Swedish shipping dominated the trade and applied a 10–15% surcharge on total trade.19 STRO searches relating to shipping with home ports at Danzig, Königsberg, Lübeck and Riga.20 Zyns actually dates the beginning of direct commercial association to 1390.21 STRO search: England and Wales ships from The Baltic.22 STRO searches: English home ports, 1557–1599.23 STRO searches: English home ports, 1600–1649.24 Ormrod has stated that the English benefitted from the closure of the Eastland Company monopoly in 1673 but in reality the company was rendered unnecessary when its monopoly was not enforced with the backing of successive English regimes of the 1650s and then 1660s (Ormrod, Citation2003, p. 283).25 STRO searches: The Baltic to England and Wales, 1660–1661.26 SSA, SCA, Vol. 29. 1666.27 Küng (Citation2003) has provided a comprehensive survey of England’s commercial relationship with Narva during the later seventeenth century.28 Åström’s research, like other historians of his generation, based its conclusions on the Sound Toll Tables. His study presented data based on decennial averages and specific figures relating to English westward trade through the Sound was only directly compared between 1630–39 and 1680–89. Special attention was also given to the period 1670–99. (Åström, Citation1963, pp. 47–50).29 Comparative STRO searches for incoming and outgoing shipping: 1670, 1675, 1680, 1685, 1690, 1695, 1700.30 Such trade deficits, especially in regard to the contrasting fortunes of Dutch traders have been given some space in previous research. Åström sought to clarify more general trends in this regard but the example of England’s specific trade deficits with Riga during this period requires more detail and attention in order to develop a proper understanding of the difficulties English merchants could face in this particular market.31 STRO, England and Wales to Riga, 1680.32 STRO, Unspecified to Riga, 1680.33 STRO, Dutch Republic to Riga, 1680. Åström drew from a rich body of scholarship on Riga’s trade that revealed the difficulties English traders faced in the town, not just in terms of strong Dutch competition but in disagreements with the local burgess community that led to significant legal wranglings. Such realities hampered trade and contrasted the commercial climate English traders experienced in Sweden which was more favourable (Åström, Citation1962, p. 125). In a more recent study of Riga’s trade with Russia, Jarmo Kotilaine has propelled the view that the Dutch had more favourable trading conditions due to better access to capital, focusing Amsterdam’s resources on the port (Kotilane, Citation2000, p. 559).34 STRO, Riga to England and Wales, 1686, 1690, 1695, 1700.35 Hinton and Åström have both commented on tobacco as a viable import commodity but failed to place it in the context of overall Baltic imports.36 A Danish ship pound (schippund or skippund) weighed 159 kilograms according to the STRO weights and measurements guidelines. These can be found online at: http://soundtoll.nl/37 This figure should be taken with a certain degree of circumspection as it is not possible to ascertain the cargoes of Swedish ships due to their passing unchecked at the Sound. STRO searches for ‘toback’ and ‘tobach’, 1675 and 1680.38 Fluctuations in the importation of English tobacco between the Duchy of Courland and Swedish Livonia have been cited as a factor that could have impacted contemporary data. Imports would periodically be landed in Libau (Liepāja) and then shipped overland to Riga to avoid arbitrarily high Swedish customs duties (Price, Citation1961, p. 9).39 STRO searches for ‘toback’ and ‘tobach’, 1675, 1680, 1686.40 For much of the seventeenth century Riga was the largest and most substantial port for traffic in the Swedish Empire. In all but three of the sample years in question Riga’s outgoing traffic was considerably higher than that of Stockholm. STRO searches: Riga and Stockholm outbound trade, 1650–1700.41 Due to inconsistencies in translation and the availability of a number of records relating to Stockholm’s trade during this period it remains difficult to come to a conclusion of how far these records were incorporated into Åström’s research (Åström, Citation1965, pp. 21–22).42 A recent study seeking to build on Müller’s work has however utilised the customs accounts. Grimshaw (Citation2022).43 Commercial developments have been touched upon in such works as Heckscher (Citation1936), an analysis of trade policy by Gerentz (Citation1951), and the role of the merchant house in trade by Müller (Citation1998). There is no study of Stockholm’s commercial development 1650–1700 equivalent to the work undertaken by Sandström (Citation1990) in the first half of the century. Grimshaw’s study of Anglo-Swedish trade and diplomacy during the seventeenth century is the first to consider the commercial interactions of Sweden and another European nation in full focus, and places Stockholm in the foreground of this work. Grimshaw (Citation2023).44 A document located in the Swedish National Archives demonstrates the extent of the sources of iron produced in Bergslagen and across Mälardalen at the end of the century. Over 50 separate destinations are listed. SRA, Handel och sjöfart, A Handel och sjöfart, Vol. 1. Järnhandeln.45 GLA, GCA, Vol. 799. 1638; Vol. 813. 1645; Vol. 819, 1649.46 SSA, SCA, Vol. 1. 1636.47 SSA, SCA, Vol. 3. 1640; Vol. 11. 1645.48 SSA, SCA, Vol. 1. 1636; Vol. 3. 1640; Vol. 11. 1645; Vol. 16. 1650.49 An export weight Swedish shippound was reckoned at 136 kilograms. (Carlsson, Citation1989, p. 58). Concurrent contemporary records exist that detail the wholesale and retail purchasing and selling of iron list the totals for some years under consideration. SRA, Stockholms vågböcker [55306], Vol. 8.1. 1640; Vol. 11.3. 1650; Vol. 15.1. 1660.50 See SCA volumes listed for Figure 4. Value of trade has been chosen as the definitive measurement to gauge the extent of trade as it remains the best commercial indicator in a comparative context.51 There were also a variety of domestic factors that instigated increases in production and exportation which can be found in Hildebrand (Citation1992). Heckscher provides a brief summary of the numerical increases in the exportation of iron over the period and into the eighteenth century (Heckscher, Citation1936, pp. 471–475).52 SSA, SCA, Vol. 29.1666; Vol. 32.1670.53 SRA, Stockholms vågböcker, Vol. 17.1. 1665; STRO, outbound traffic from Stockholm, 1665.54 This pattern was mirrored in the English import trade to Stockholm.55 Bjurling has provided total import and export figures based on Swedish riksdaler for his focus period of 1671–1679 which tally with the findings from this study. However he did not provide figures relating to total trade value by destination.56 STRO searches for outbound voyages to England and the Dutch Republic from various major Baltic ports, 1668–1700.57 It must be stressed that the values shown here represent England’s combined import trade originating from England as well as on English ships from third party harbours.58 SSA, SCA, Vol. 59. 1680.59 A number of Scottish merchants with burgess rights are mentioned in the minutes of the Stockholm town trade council. SSA, Stockholm Handelskollegiet Protokoll, Vols. 1–7. 1635, 1638–1639, 1639–1640, 1642–1644, 1652–1654, 1655, 1658–1653.60 SSA, SCA, Vol. 1. 1636.61 SSA, SCA, Vol. 21. 1655.62 SSA, SCA, Vol. 27. 1660.63 SSA, SCA, Vol. 27. 1660. For example with comparison to ports such as Amsterdam, Lübeck or Danzig many of the same commercial operators were present of which many could be of Swedish, Scottish, Dutch, German, Baltic or of an ambiguous extraction.64 For more on English communities in Sweden see: Grimshaw (Citation2018).65 The Treaty of 1654 is printed in: (Jenkinson, Citation1909, pp. 69–70). The Treaty of 1656 can be found in Patterson, F. A. (1937), pp. 566-591. The Treaty of 1661 is printed in: (Hertslet, Citation1820, pp. 324–333). The Treaty of 1665 can be found in TNA, SP 103/69.66 This was a similar tactic employed a generation earlier but in the opposite direction.67 See Figure 4. Current research has leant more nuance to the role of treaties between foreign powers and its impact on trade. This has surpassed the established, rudimentary view that the conclusion of commercial treaties (in the case of Dutch-Swedish agreements at the turn of the 1680s) simply led to the growth of trade. Israel (Citation1989, pp. 300–304). Henri Hannula’s research into the foreign policy of the Dutch Republic and Sweden has demonstrated the plurality of voices that sought to influence such agreements at this time. (Hannula, Citation2023, pp. 123–149). Although this research has focused more on negotiation processes rather than cataloguing the level of resulting trade, Grimshaw’s research into Swedish trade has shown that market forces, above all, dictated the main movements of trade regardless of codified agreements. Grimshaw (Citation2023), specifically chapter four.68 Swedish diplomat Johan Barckman Leijonberg was promoted to Resident at this time. See: Anon, ‘Leijonberg, släkt’.69 English commercial complaints regarding trade with Swedish controlled areas across the Baltic can be found throughout the Colonial Office Papers. For example: TNA, CO 388/1.