行为代理与分析师的外部监督效能:检视CEO人格的调节作用

IF 6.5 1区管理学 Q1 BUSINESS

Strategic Management Journal Pub Date : 2023-09-26 DOI:10.1002/smj.3548

Alina G. Andrei, Mirko H. Benischke, Geoffrey P. Martin

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要本文结合行为代理研究和人格五因素模型，重新考察投资分析师效能作为降低代理成本的机制。我们强调人格在塑造首席执行官如何回应分析师建议方面的作用，从而导致分析师作为外部监督者的有效性的边界条件。我们的理论认为，CEO从更积极的分析师建议中感受到威胁的程度取决于他们的个性，这决定了他们对建议的主观解释，以及他们使用增加收入的盈余管理作为回应。我们的研究结果表明，人格对于理解ceo如何应对外部监督和与积极分析师建议相关的代理成本至关重要。

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Behavioral agency and the efficacy of analysts as external monitors: Examining the moderating role of CEO personality

Abstract We integrate behavioral agency research and the five‐factor model of personality to re‐visit investment analysts' efficacy as a mechanism for reducing agency costs. We highlight the role of personality in shaping how CEOs respond to analyst recommendations, leading to boundary conditions for the efficacy of analysts as external monitors. We theorize that the extent to which a CEO perceives a threat from more positive analyst recommendations is contingent upon their personality, which shapes their subjective interpretation of the recommendation and their use of income‐increasing earnings management in response. Our findings suggest that personality is critical to understanding how CEOs respond to external monitors and the agency costs associated with the positive analyst recommendations.

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来源期刊

Strategic Management Journal Multiple-

CiteScore

13.70

自引率

8.40%

发文量

109

期刊介绍： At the Strategic Management Journal, we are committed to publishing top-tier research that addresses key questions in the field of strategic management and captivates scholars in this area. Our publication welcomes manuscripts covering a wide range of topics, perspectives, and research methodologies. As a result, our editorial decisions truly embrace the diversity inherent in the field.