破产改革是否能提高政治关联企业的绩效?来自印度的证据

IF 1.2 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Kousik Ganguly, Ajay Kumar Mishra
{"title":"破产改革是否能提高政治关联企业的绩效?来自印度的证据","authors":"Kousik Ganguly, Ajay Kumar Mishra","doi":"10.1177/09726527231196926","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Using a sample of 1,953 listed firms on the National Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2021, we investigate whether politically connected firms alter their cash holding patterns following the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) reforms introduced in 2016. We also examine the impact of changes in a firm’s cash holdings on its performance. Results show that politically connected firms reduced their cash holdings following the implementation of IBC in 2016, as new reforms better protected creditors through strict enforcement rights. We also find that politically connected firms with large amounts of cash perform poorly in the post-IBC period compared to their nonconnected peers. The results are robust after excluding the COVID-19 period and controlling for firm size, leverage, and business group affiliations. JEL Codes: G32; G34; G38","PeriodicalId":44100,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Emerging Market Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-11-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Does Bankruptcy Reforms Enhance Firm Performances for Politically Connected Firms? Evidence from India\",\"authors\":\"Kousik Ganguly, Ajay Kumar Mishra\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/09726527231196926\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Using a sample of 1,953 listed firms on the National Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2021, we investigate whether politically connected firms alter their cash holding patterns following the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) reforms introduced in 2016. We also examine the impact of changes in a firm’s cash holdings on its performance. Results show that politically connected firms reduced their cash holdings following the implementation of IBC in 2016, as new reforms better protected creditors through strict enforcement rights. We also find that politically connected firms with large amounts of cash perform poorly in the post-IBC period compared to their nonconnected peers. The results are robust after excluding the COVID-19 period and controlling for firm size, leverage, and business group affiliations. JEL Codes: G32; G34; G38\",\"PeriodicalId\":44100,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Emerging Market Finance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-11-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Emerging Market Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/09726527231196926\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q3\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Emerging Market Finance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/09726527231196926","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

摘要

我们以2009年至2021年在国家证券交易所上市的1953家公司为样本,调查了在2016年引入的《破产法》(IBC)改革后,政治关联公司是否改变了其现金持有模式。我们还研究了公司现金持有量变化对其业绩的影响。结果显示,在2016年IBC实施后,有政治关系的公司减少了现金持有量,因为新的改革通过严格的执行权更好地保护了债权人。我们还发现,与没有政治关系的公司相比,拥有大量现金的有政治关系的公司在后ibc时期表现不佳。在排除了COVID-19期间并控制了公司规模、杠杆率和商业集团隶属关系后,结果是稳健的。JEL代码:G32;G34;G38
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Does Bankruptcy Reforms Enhance Firm Performances for Politically Connected Firms? Evidence from India
Using a sample of 1,953 listed firms on the National Stock Exchange from 2009 to 2021, we investigate whether politically connected firms alter their cash holding patterns following the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) reforms introduced in 2016. We also examine the impact of changes in a firm’s cash holdings on its performance. Results show that politically connected firms reduced their cash holdings following the implementation of IBC in 2016, as new reforms better protected creditors through strict enforcement rights. We also find that politically connected firms with large amounts of cash perform poorly in the post-IBC period compared to their nonconnected peers. The results are robust after excluding the COVID-19 period and controlling for firm size, leverage, and business group affiliations. JEL Codes: G32; G34; G38
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
CiteScore
1.80
自引率
33.30%
发文量
19
期刊介绍: The Journal of Emerging Market Finance is a forum for debate and discussion on the theory and practice of finance in emerging markets. While the emphasis is on articles that are of practical significance, the journal also covers theoretical and conceptual aspects relating to emerging financial markets. Peer-reviewed, the journal is equally useful to practitioners and to banking and investment companies as to scholars.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信