脆弱的融合:美日韩戴维营峰会

IF 1.5 3区社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Survival Pub Date : 2023-09-03 DOI:10.1080/00396338.2023.2261241

Robert Ward

{"title":"脆弱的融合:美日韩戴维营峰会","authors":"Robert Ward","doi":"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261241","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe US–Japan–South Korea summit was historic, not least because it was the first stand-alone summit between the three countries. The severe deterioration in the security environment in East Asia, in particular China’s menacing of Taiwan and North Korea’s continued nuclear-weapons programme, has been a significant driver of the recent rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. The warming of bilateral ties thus helps to buttress the United States’ separate, formal security alliances between Japan on the one hand and South Korea on the other. But previous thaws have failed, reflecting lingering differences between Japan and South Korea in areas such as their shared history and territorial claims. This convergence is therefore a fragile one.Key words: Camp David SummitChina‘comfort women’East China SeaIndo-PacificJapanKishida FumioKorean PeninsulaPhnom Penh StatementSouth KoreaYoon Suk-yeol Notes1 US Embassy and Consulates in Japan, ‘Trilateral Leaders’ Summit of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea’, 19 August 2023, https://jp.usembassy.gov/trilateral-leaders-summit-us-japan-south-korea/#:~:text=President%20Biden%20welcomed%20Japanese%20Prime,David%20during%20the%20Biden%2DHarris.2 Victor D. Cha, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea– Japan Normalization Treaty’, Korean Studies, vol. 20, 1996, p. 125.3 White House, ‘Phnom Penh Statement on US–Japan–Republic of Korea Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific’, 13 November 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/phnom-penh-statement-on-trilateral-partnership-for-the-indo-pacific/.4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–ROK Summit Telephone Call’, 28 December 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000366.html.5 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States’, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.6 One early example of this was the ‘Korea clause’ in the November 1969 communiqué between US president Richard Nixon and Japan’s prime minister Sato Eisaku. This was the first public recognition by Japan that South Korea’s security ‘was essential to Japan’s own security’, although support for the clause ebbed and flowed with the Japanese governments that followed. The communiqué came at a time of increased security tensions in Asia against the background of the Vietnam War and the threat of a newly nuclear China. See ‘The Nixon–Sato Communique’, New York Times, 22 November 1969, p. 14, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/11/22/issue.html; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US–Korea– Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), chapter 1.7 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, ‘Keynote Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue’, 10 June 2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202206/_00002.html.8 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Introducing the Indo-Pacific Strategy’, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_26382/contents.do.9 For a map of Chinese and Russian joint patrols and exercises, see Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward, ‘Japan Steps Up: Security and Defence Policy Under Kishida’, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2023: Key Developments and Trends (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2023), p. 119.10 See, for example, James Politi, ‘North Korea’s Kim Plans to Visit Putin to Discuss Arms Sales, US Says’, Financial Times, 4 September 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/11cc1d36-6783-4ab0-96d1-edd27d06b54d.11 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David’.12 White House, ‘Commitment to Consult’, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/commitment-to-consult/#:~:text=We%2C%20the%20leaders%20of%20Japan,our%20collective%20interests%20and%20security.13 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David’.14 Samsung already has a research and development facility in the city. See Kotaro Hosokawa, ‘Samsung to Build Chip Development Facility in Japan’, Nikkei Asia, 13 May 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Samsung-to-build-chip-development-facility-in-Japan.15 ‘Chugoku Sei, Sentan Hin de Sekai Shea Kakudai, 22 Nen Chosa’ 中国勢、先端品で世界シェア拡大22年調査 [China expands global share of advanced products, 2022 survey], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 5 September 2023, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO74169420V00C23A9MM8000/.16 Huaxia, ‘Xinhua Commentary: Trilateral Meeting at Camp David Stokes Embers of Cold War’, Xinhua, 20 August 2023, https://english.news.cn/20230820/55275e1196b14b6db7d7a099c91e842c/c.html.17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership Towards the Twenty-first Century’, 8 October 1998, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html.18 In 1973, for example, Kim Dae-jung was kidnapped from a hotel in Tokyo by agents from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency on account of his criticism of Park Chung-hee’s regime. In 1980, he was sentenced to death after the uprising in Gwangju triggered by the coup that brought Chung Doo-hwan to power, although this sentence was later commuted to a prison sentence.19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Issues Regarding History, Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary’, 4 August 1993, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000343.html. For an account of the deterioration in bilateral ties in this period, see Kimiya Tadashi, Nikkan Kankei Shi 日韓関係史 [A history of Japan–South Korea relations] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2021), pp. 169–71.20 Lee Jong Won et al., Sengo Nikkan Kankei Shi 戦後日韓関係史 [A contemporary history of Japan–South Korea relations since the Second World War ] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2017), p. 252.21 See United Nations, ‘No. 8473 Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Cooperation Between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Signed at Tokyo, on 22 June 1965’, Treaty Series, 1966, p. 260, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-583-I-8473-English.pdf.22 Kim Han-joo, ‘Yoon’s Approval Rating Inches Up to 33 pct’, Yonhap News Agency, 21 July 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230721003000315.23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–Republic of Korea Relations, Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion’, 28 December 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html.24 Kiyomiya Ryo, Nishimura Keishi and Inada Kiyohide, ‘Nichibeikan, “Zenrei Nai Reberu” de Anpo Kyoryoku e, Mae Nomeri no Beikoku, Nikkan wa?’ 日米韓、「前例ないレベル」で安保協力へ前のめりの米国、日韓は？ [Towards unprecedented Japan–US–South Korea security cooperation: forward-leaning US, but what about Japan and South Korea?], Asahi Shimbun, 19 August 2023, https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASR8M62SRR8MUTFK00B.html.25 Choe Sang-hun, ‘In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option’, New York Times, 12 January 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html.26 Koshino and Ward, ‘Japan Steps Up’, pp. 121–6.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRobert WardRobert Ward is IISS Japan Chair and Director of Geo-economics and Strategy.","PeriodicalId":51535,"journal":{"name":"Survival","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.5000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Fragile Convergence: The US–Japan–South Korea Camp David Summit\",\"authors\":\"Robert Ward\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/00396338.2023.2261241\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"AbstractThe US–Japan–South Korea summit was historic, not least because it was the first stand-alone summit between the three countries. The severe deterioration in the security environment in East Asia, in particular China’s menacing of Taiwan and North Korea’s continued nuclear-weapons programme, has been a significant driver of the recent rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. The warming of bilateral ties thus helps to buttress the United States’ separate, formal security alliances between Japan on the one hand and South Korea on the other. But previous thaws have failed, reflecting lingering differences between Japan and South Korea in areas such as their shared history and territorial claims. This convergence is therefore a fragile one.Key words: Camp David SummitChina‘comfort women’East China SeaIndo-PacificJapanKishida FumioKorean PeninsulaPhnom Penh StatementSouth KoreaYoon Suk-yeol Notes1 US Embassy and Consulates in Japan, ‘Trilateral Leaders’ Summit of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea’, 19 August 2023, https://jp.usembassy.gov/trilateral-leaders-summit-us-japan-south-korea/#:~:text=President%20Biden%20welcomed%20Japanese%20Prime,David%20during%20the%20Biden%2DHarris.2 Victor D. Cha, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea– Japan Normalization Treaty’, Korean Studies, vol. 20, 1996, p. 125.3 White House, ‘Phnom Penh Statement on US–Japan–Republic of Korea Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific’, 13 November 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/phnom-penh-statement-on-trilateral-partnership-for-the-indo-pacific/.4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–ROK Summit Telephone Call’, 28 December 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000366.html.5 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States’, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.6 One early example of this was the ‘Korea clause’ in the November 1969 communiqué between US president Richard Nixon and Japan’s prime minister Sato Eisaku. This was the first public recognition by Japan that South Korea’s security ‘was essential to Japan’s own security’, although support for the clause ebbed and flowed with the Japanese governments that followed. The communiqué came at a time of increased security tensions in Asia against the background of the Vietnam War and the threat of a newly nuclear China. See ‘The Nixon–Sato Communique’, New York Times, 22 November 1969, p. 14, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/11/22/issue.html; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US–Korea– Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), chapter 1.7 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, ‘Keynote Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue’, 10 June 2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202206/_00002.html.8 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Introducing the Indo-Pacific Strategy’, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_26382/contents.do.9 For a map of Chinese and Russian joint patrols and exercises, see Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward, ‘Japan Steps Up: Security and Defence Policy Under Kishida’, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2023: Key Developments and Trends (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2023), p. 119.10 See, for example, James Politi, ‘North Korea’s Kim Plans to Visit Putin to Discuss Arms Sales, US Says’, Financial Times, 4 September 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/11cc1d36-6783-4ab0-96d1-edd27d06b54d.11 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David’.12 White House, ‘Commitment to Consult’, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/commitment-to-consult/#:~:text=We%2C%20the%20leaders%20of%20Japan,our%20collective%20interests%20and%20security.13 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David’.14 Samsung already has a research and development facility in the city. See Kotaro Hosokawa, ‘Samsung to Build Chip Development Facility in Japan’, Nikkei Asia, 13 May 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Samsung-to-build-chip-development-facility-in-Japan.15 ‘Chugoku Sei, Sentan Hin de Sekai Shea Kakudai, 22 Nen Chosa’ 中国勢、先端品で世界シェア拡大22年調査 [China expands global share of advanced products, 2022 survey], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 5 September 2023, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO74169420V00C23A9MM8000/.16 Huaxia, ‘Xinhua Commentary: Trilateral Meeting at Camp David Stokes Embers of Cold War’, Xinhua, 20 August 2023, https://english.news.cn/20230820/55275e1196b14b6db7d7a099c91e842c/c.html.17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership Towards the Twenty-first Century’, 8 October 1998, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html.18 In 1973, for example, Kim Dae-jung was kidnapped from a hotel in Tokyo by agents from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency on account of his criticism of Park Chung-hee’s regime. In 1980, he was sentenced to death after the uprising in Gwangju triggered by the coup that brought Chung Doo-hwan to power, although this sentence was later commuted to a prison sentence.19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Issues Regarding History, Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary’, 4 August 1993, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000343.html. For an account of the deterioration in bilateral ties in this period, see Kimiya Tadashi, Nikkan Kankei Shi 日韓関係史 [A history of Japan–South Korea relations] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2021), pp. 169–71.20 Lee Jong Won et al., Sengo Nikkan Kankei Shi 戦後日韓関係史 [A contemporary history of Japan–South Korea relations since the Second World War ] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2017), p. 252.21 See United Nations, ‘No. 8473 Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Cooperation Between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Signed at Tokyo, on 22 June 1965’, Treaty Series, 1966, p. 260, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-583-I-8473-English.pdf.22 Kim Han-joo, ‘Yoon’s Approval Rating Inches Up to 33 pct’, Yonhap News Agency, 21 July 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230721003000315.23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–Republic of Korea Relations, Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion’, 28 December 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html.24 Kiyomiya Ryo, Nishimura Keishi and Inada Kiyohide, ‘Nichibeikan, “Zenrei Nai Reberu” de Anpo Kyoryoku e, Mae Nomeri no Beikoku, Nikkan wa?’ 日米韓、「前例ないレベル」で安保協力へ前のめりの米国、日韓は？ [Towards unprecedented Japan–US–South Korea security cooperation: forward-leaning US, but what about Japan and South Korea?], Asahi Shimbun, 19 August 2023, https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASR8M62SRR8MUTFK00B.html.25 Choe Sang-hun, ‘In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option’, New York Times, 12 January 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html.26 Koshino and Ward, ‘Japan Steps Up’, pp. 121–6.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRobert WardRobert Ward is IISS Japan Chair and Director of Geo-economics and Strategy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":51535,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Survival\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":1.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-09-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Survival\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261241\",\"RegionNum\":3,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Survival","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2023.2261241","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要美日韩首脑会议具有历史意义，因为这是三国之间首次单独举行的首脑会议。东亚安全环境的严重恶化，特别是中国对台湾的威胁和朝鲜持续的核武器计划，是日本和韩国最近和解的一个重要推动因素。因此，双边关系的升温有助于巩固美国与日本和韩国之间独立的正式安全联盟。但之前的解冻都以失败告终，反映出日韩两国在共同的历史和领土主张等领域存在挥之不去的分歧。因此，这种趋同是脆弱的。关键词:戴维营峰会;中国“慰安妇”;东海太平洋;日本;岸田文雄;朝鲜半岛;金边声明;韩国;尹锡烈注1;美国驻日使领馆;《1965年韩日正常化条约的战略背景》，《韩国学》1996年第20期，第125.3页。白宫:《关于美、日、韩三国印太伙伴关系的金边声明》，2022年11月13日，https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/phnom-penh-statement-on-trilateral-partnership-for-the-indo-pacific/.4日本外务省:《日韩首脑通话》，2015年12月28日。https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000366.html.5白宫:《戴维营的精神》《日、韩、美联合声明》，2023年8月18日，https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.6这方面的一个早期例子是1969年11月美国总统理查德·尼克松和日本首相佐藤荣作之间的公报中的“韩国条款”。这是日本第一次公开承认韩国的安全“对日本自身的安全至关重要”，尽管对这一条款的支持在随后的日本政府中时断时续。上述公报发布之际，正值越南战争和中国新核威胁的背景下，亚洲的安全紧张局势加剧。见1969年11月22日《纽约时报》“尼克松-佐藤公报”，第14页，https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/11/22/issue.html;Victor D. Cha，《对抗中的结盟:美韩日安全三角》(斯坦福，加州);斯坦福大学出版社，1999年)，第1.7章，日本首相办公室，“岸田文雄首相在国际战略研究所香格里拉对话上的主旨演讲”，2022年6月10日，https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202206/_00002.html.8韩国，外交部，“介绍印太战略”，https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_26382/contents.do.9关于中俄联合巡逻和演习的地图，见小野洋香和罗伯特·沃德，“日本加强:岸田文雄领导下的安全和防务政策”，《2023年亚太地区安全评估:关键发展和趋势》(阿宾顿:劳特利奇研究所，2023年)，第119.10页。例如，参见James Politi，“美国称，朝鲜金正日计划访问普京讨论军售”，《金融时报》，2023年9月4日，https://www.ft.com/content/11cc1d36-6783-4ab0-96d1-edd27d06b54d.11白宫，“戴维营的精神”白宫，“承诺咨询”，2023年8月18日，https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/commitment-to-consult/#:~:text=We%2C%20the%20leaders%20of%20Japan,our%20collective%20interests%20and%20security.13白宫，“戴维营的精神”三星已经在该市设立了一个研发中心。看到Kotaro细川”,三星在日本构建芯片开发设施,日经亚洲,2023年5月13日,https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Samsung-to-build-chip-development-facility-in-Japan.15的Chugoku Sei Sentan欣德饥荒谢伊Kakudai 22 Nen Chosa的中国勢,先端品で世界シェア拡大22年調査(中国扩大全球先进的产品,2022年的调查),日本经济新闻,2023年9月5日,https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO74169420V00C23A9MM8000/.16华夏”,新华社评论:2023年8月20日，新华社，https://english.news.cn/20230820/55275e1196b14b6db7d7a099c91e842c/c.html.17日本外务省，1998年10月8日，《大韩民国联合宣言:面向21世纪的新伙伴关系》，https://www.mofa.go。 jp /地区/ asia-paci /韩国/ joint9810.html.18例如，1973年，金大中因批评朴正熙政权而在东京一家酒店被韩国中央情报局特工绑架。1980年，在郑斗焕掌权的光州起义后，他被判处死刑，不过后来改判为有期徒刑日本外务省，“关于历史的问题，内阁官房长官的谈话”，1993年8月4日，https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000343.html。关于这一时期双边关系恶化的解释，见Kimiya Tadashi, Nikkan Kankei Shi(东京:岩上新正，2021年)，第169-71.20页。Lee Jong Won等人，Sengo Nikkan Kankei Shi(第二次世界大战以来的日韩关系史)(东京:Yuhikaku, 2017年)，第252.21页。《关于解决日本和大韩民国财产和索赔问题及经济合作的协定》。签署了在东京,1965年6月22日,条约系列,1966年,p . 260年,https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20583/volume - 583 - i - 8473 - english.pdf.22金Han-joo,”尹的支持率英寸33 pct的通讯社,2023年7月21日,https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230721003000315.23日本外交部的韩国Japan-Republic关系,宣布日本和韩国外长举行的联合记者场合,2015年12月28日,https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html.24清宫亮，西村圭时，稻田清英，日北馆，“真雷奈瑞”de Anpo kyyorku e, Mae Nomeri no Beikoku，日北馆?’，“?面对空前的日美韩安全合作:美国的前瞻，但日本和韩国呢?]，朝日新闻，2023年8月19日，https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASR8M62SRR8MUTFK00B.html.25 Choe Sang-hun，“首次，韩国宣布核武器的政策选择”，纽约时报，2023年1月12日，https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html.26 Koshino和Ward，“日本的步骤”，第121-6页。罗伯特·沃德(robert Ward)是IISS日本主席和地缘经济与战略主任。

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A Fragile Convergence: The US–Japan–South Korea Camp David Summit

AbstractThe US–Japan–South Korea summit was historic, not least because it was the first stand-alone summit between the three countries. The severe deterioration in the security environment in East Asia, in particular China’s menacing of Taiwan and North Korea’s continued nuclear-weapons programme, has been a significant driver of the recent rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. The warming of bilateral ties thus helps to buttress the United States’ separate, formal security alliances between Japan on the one hand and South Korea on the other. But previous thaws have failed, reflecting lingering differences between Japan and South Korea in areas such as their shared history and territorial claims. This convergence is therefore a fragile one.Key words: Camp David SummitChina‘comfort women’East China SeaIndo-PacificJapanKishida FumioKorean PeninsulaPhnom Penh StatementSouth KoreaYoon Suk-yeol Notes1 US Embassy and Consulates in Japan, ‘Trilateral Leaders’ Summit of the United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea’, 19 August 2023, https://jp.usembassy.gov/trilateral-leaders-summit-us-japan-south-korea/#:~:text=President%20Biden%20welcomed%20Japanese%20Prime,David%20during%20the%20Biden%2DHarris.2 Victor D. Cha, ‘Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea– Japan Normalization Treaty’, Korean Studies, vol. 20, 1996, p. 125.3 White House, ‘Phnom Penh Statement on US–Japan–Republic of Korea Trilateral Partnership for the Indo-Pacific’, 13 November 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/13/phnom-penh-statement-on-trilateral-partnership-for-the-indo-pacific/.4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–ROK Summit Telephone Call’, 28 December 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000366.html.5 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States’, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states/.6 One early example of this was the ‘Korea clause’ in the November 1969 communiqué between US president Richard Nixon and Japan’s prime minister Sato Eisaku. This was the first public recognition by Japan that South Korea’s security ‘was essential to Japan’s own security’, although support for the clause ebbed and flowed with the Japanese governments that followed. The communiqué came at a time of increased security tensions in Asia against the background of the Vietnam War and the threat of a newly nuclear China. See ‘The Nixon–Sato Communique’, New York Times, 22 November 1969, p. 14, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1969/11/22/issue.html; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The US–Korea– Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), chapter 1.7 Prime Minister’s Office of Japan, ‘Keynote Address by Prime Minister Kishida Fumio at the IISS Shangri-La Dialogue’, 10 June 2022, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/101_kishida/statement/202206/_00002.html.8 Republic of Korea, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Introducing the Indo-Pacific Strategy’, https://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/wpge/m_26382/contents.do.9 For a map of Chinese and Russian joint patrols and exercises, see Yuka Koshino and Robert Ward, ‘Japan Steps Up: Security and Defence Policy Under Kishida’, Asia-Pacific Regional Security Assessment 2023: Key Developments and Trends (Abingdon: Routledge for the IISS, 2023), p. 119.10 See, for example, James Politi, ‘North Korea’s Kim Plans to Visit Putin to Discuss Arms Sales, US Says’, Financial Times, 4 September 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/11cc1d36-6783-4ab0-96d1-edd27d06b54d.11 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David’.12 White House, ‘Commitment to Consult’, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/commitment-to-consult/#:~:text=We%2C%20the%20leaders%20of%20Japan,our%20collective%20interests%20and%20security.13 White House, ‘The Spirit of Camp David’.14 Samsung already has a research and development facility in the city. See Kotaro Hosokawa, ‘Samsung to Build Chip Development Facility in Japan’, Nikkei Asia, 13 May 2023, https://asia.nikkei.com/Business/Tech/Semiconductors/Samsung-to-build-chip-development-facility-in-Japan.15 ‘Chugoku Sei, Sentan Hin de Sekai Shea Kakudai, 22 Nen Chosa’ 中国勢、先端品で世界シェア拡大22年調査 [China expands global share of advanced products, 2022 survey], Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 5 September 2023, https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKZO74169420V00C23A9MM8000/.16 Huaxia, ‘Xinhua Commentary: Trilateral Meeting at Camp David Stokes Embers of Cold War’, Xinhua, 20 August 2023, https://english.news.cn/20230820/55275e1196b14b6db7d7a099c91e842c/c.html.17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan–Republic of Korea Partnership Towards the Twenty-first Century’, 8 October 1998, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/korea/joint9810.html.18 In 1973, for example, Kim Dae-jung was kidnapped from a hotel in Tokyo by agents from the Korean Central Intelligence Agency on account of his criticism of Park Chung-hee’s regime. In 1980, he was sentenced to death after the uprising in Gwangju triggered by the coup that brought Chung Doo-hwan to power, although this sentence was later commuted to a prison sentence.19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Issues Regarding History, Statement by the Chief Cabinet Secretary’, 4 August 1993, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/rp/page25e_000343.html. For an account of the deterioration in bilateral ties in this period, see Kimiya Tadashi, Nikkan Kankei Shi 日韓関係史 [A history of Japan–South Korea relations] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 2021), pp. 169–71.20 Lee Jong Won et al., Sengo Nikkan Kankei Shi 戦後日韓関係史 [A contemporary history of Japan–South Korea relations since the Second World War ] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 2017), p. 252.21 See United Nations, ‘No. 8473 Agreement on the Settlement of Problems Concerning Property and Claims and on Economic Cooperation Between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Signed at Tokyo, on 22 June 1965’, Treaty Series, 1966, p. 260, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20583/volume-583-I-8473-English.pdf.22 Kim Han-joo, ‘Yoon’s Approval Rating Inches Up to 33 pct’, Yonhap News Agency, 21 July 2023, https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20230721003000315.23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, ‘Japan–Republic of Korea Relations, Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion’, 28 December 2015, https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html.24 Kiyomiya Ryo, Nishimura Keishi and Inada Kiyohide, ‘Nichibeikan, “Zenrei Nai Reberu” de Anpo Kyoryoku e, Mae Nomeri no Beikoku, Nikkan wa?’ 日米韓、「前例ないレベル」で安保協力へ前のめりの米国、日韓は？ [Towards unprecedented Japan–US–South Korea security cooperation: forward-leaning US, but what about Japan and South Korea?], Asahi Shimbun, 19 August 2023, https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASR8M62SRR8MUTFK00B.html.25 Choe Sang-hun, ‘In a First, South Korea Declares Nuclear Weapons a Policy Option’, New York Times, 12 January 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/12/world/asia/south-korea-nuclear-weapons.html.26 Koshino and Ward, ‘Japan Steps Up’, pp. 121–6.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRobert WardRobert Ward is IISS Japan Chair and Director of Geo-economics and Strategy.

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Survival Multiple-

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2.10

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16.70%

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期刊介绍： Survival, the Institute"s bi-monthly journal, is a leading forum for analysis and debate of international and strategic affairs. With a diverse range of authors, thoughtful reviews and review essays, Survival is scholarly in depth while vivid, well-written and policy-relevant in approach. Shaped by its editors to be both timely and forward-thinking, the journal encourages writers to challenge conventional wisdom and bring fresh, often controversial, perspectives to bear on the strategic issues of the moment. Survival is essential reading for practitioners, analysts, teachers and followers of international affairs. Each issue also contains Book Reviews of the most important recent publications on international politics and security.