A Stackelberg game framework for resource management in the CloudPoS-Based blockchain network

ABSTRACTThis paper proposes a two-stage Stackelberg game framework to study resource management in a CloudPoS-based blockchain network, analyzes multiple factors’ impact on optimal strategies and profits of cloud service provider (CSP) and miners. The results show that the proposed model can maximize the profits of CSP and miners, the fixed reward, the total supply, and the propagation delay have a monotonic impact on miners’ decisions, but a non-monotonic impact on CSP’s decisions; the number of miners has a non-monotonic impact on both decisions. Our findings emphasize that the CSP should control the number of miners participating in cloud mining and the total supply of resources.KEYWORDS: blockchaincloud computingproof-of-stakeStackelberg gameprice decision AcknowledgmentsThis research is partially funded by the grant of National Natural Science Foundation of China [No. 71971218], the National Social Science project of China “Research on Improving Logistics Service Quality and Low Carbon Governance Mechanism (21FGLB046)”.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Additional informationFundingThis work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [71971218].