{"title":"企业部门的情报预警:2013年in Amenas恐怖袭击的回顾","authors":"Michael J. Ard","doi":"10.1080/18335330.2023.2274614","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe 2013 terrorist attack at the In Amenas, Algeria gas production facility killed 40 innocent people and shook the corporate security industry. Analyzing this event raises important questions about the nature and limitations of intelligence warning for private industry. Corporate security intelligence has been adopted by many companies that desire a ‘decision advantage’, but in this case, it failed to foresee the attack. A seminal report on the attack produced by Statoil (now Equinor) encouraged numerous changes in how companies should protect themselves against severe security threats. One conclusion was that in uncertain and dangerous environments, intelligence cannot be relied upon to reduce uncertainty and provide adequate warning. The Statoil report acknowledges that the joint venture likely would not have gotten the intelligence necessary to warn of an impending attack. The core business is not necessarily focused on the changing threat environment. In this case, even more accurate ‘tactical’ intelligence might not have led to a timely evacuation. Moreover, as the Algerian Army's failure to prevent the In Amenas attack reveals, corporations' risk assessments cannot ignore the severe limitations of their host country security institutions. This case study raises some concerns about overvaluing corporate intelligence’s effectiveness in high-risk security environments.KEYWORDS: TerrorismwarningintelligenceAlgeriaoil and gas industry Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.","PeriodicalId":37849,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism","volume":"32 9","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Intelligence warning in the corporate sector: the 2013 In Amenas terrorist attack in retrospect\",\"authors\":\"Michael J. Ard\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/18335330.2023.2274614\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACTThe 2013 terrorist attack at the In Amenas, Algeria gas production facility killed 40 innocent people and shook the corporate security industry. Analyzing this event raises important questions about the nature and limitations of intelligence warning for private industry. Corporate security intelligence has been adopted by many companies that desire a ‘decision advantage’, but in this case, it failed to foresee the attack. A seminal report on the attack produced by Statoil (now Equinor) encouraged numerous changes in how companies should protect themselves against severe security threats. One conclusion was that in uncertain and dangerous environments, intelligence cannot be relied upon to reduce uncertainty and provide adequate warning. The Statoil report acknowledges that the joint venture likely would not have gotten the intelligence necessary to warn of an impending attack. The core business is not necessarily focused on the changing threat environment. In this case, even more accurate ‘tactical’ intelligence might not have led to a timely evacuation. Moreover, as the Algerian Army's failure to prevent the In Amenas attack reveals, corporations' risk assessments cannot ignore the severe limitations of their host country security institutions. This case study raises some concerns about overvaluing corporate intelligence’s effectiveness in high-risk security environments.KEYWORDS: TerrorismwarningintelligenceAlgeriaoil and gas industry Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.\",\"PeriodicalId\":37849,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism\",\"volume\":\"32 9\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-10-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2023.2274614\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"Social Sciences\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/18335330.2023.2274614","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"Social Sciences","Score":null,"Total":0}
Intelligence warning in the corporate sector: the 2013 In Amenas terrorist attack in retrospect
ABSTRACTThe 2013 terrorist attack at the In Amenas, Algeria gas production facility killed 40 innocent people and shook the corporate security industry. Analyzing this event raises important questions about the nature and limitations of intelligence warning for private industry. Corporate security intelligence has been adopted by many companies that desire a ‘decision advantage’, but in this case, it failed to foresee the attack. A seminal report on the attack produced by Statoil (now Equinor) encouraged numerous changes in how companies should protect themselves against severe security threats. One conclusion was that in uncertain and dangerous environments, intelligence cannot be relied upon to reduce uncertainty and provide adequate warning. The Statoil report acknowledges that the joint venture likely would not have gotten the intelligence necessary to warn of an impending attack. The core business is not necessarily focused on the changing threat environment. In this case, even more accurate ‘tactical’ intelligence might not have led to a timely evacuation. Moreover, as the Algerian Army's failure to prevent the In Amenas attack reveals, corporations' risk assessments cannot ignore the severe limitations of their host country security institutions. This case study raises some concerns about overvaluing corporate intelligence’s effectiveness in high-risk security environments.KEYWORDS: TerrorismwarningintelligenceAlgeriaoil and gas industry Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism (JPICT) is an international peer reviewed scholarly journal that acts as a forum for those around the world undertaking high quality research and practice in the areas of: Policing studies, Intelligence studies, Terrorism and counter terrorism studies; Cyber-policing, intelligence and terrorism. The Journal offers national, regional and international perspectives on current areas of scholarly and applied debate within these fields, while addressing the practical and theoretical issues and considerations that surround them. It aims to balance the discussion of practical realities with debates and research on relevant and significant theoretical issues. The Journal has the following major aims: To publish cutting-edge and contemporary research articles, reports and reviews on relevant topics; To publish articles that explore the interface between the areas of policing, intelligence and terrorism studies; To act as an international forum for exchange and discussion; To illustrate the nexus between theory and its practical applications and vice versa.