S. Mouatassim, A. Sabry, Mustapha Ahlaqqach, J. Benhra
{"title":"一种利用异构博弈进行配电网成本优化的新框架","authors":"S. Mouatassim, A. Sabry, Mustapha Ahlaqqach, J. Benhra","doi":"10.1504/ijids.2020.10028225","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The present work focuses on the demand decision making problem for regional distribution centres sharing the same product families. Each centre orders quantities to be distributed from production units. Our approach suggests a biform game to maximise the benefits of each centre and minimise the end of cycle market induced supply to demand deviations. We start by an independent demand forecasting under uncertainty. Once the demand is met, the centres enter a collaboration phase where coalitions are created and products are exchanged, in order to achieve the core stability of the actual game. If not met, we try to achieve the same objectives using individual rationality through an adapted approach based on Shapley value analysis for each possible coalition.","PeriodicalId":303039,"journal":{"name":"Int. J. Inf. Decis. Sci.","volume":"82 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-04","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A new framework using biform game for cost optimisation of distribution networks\",\"authors\":\"S. Mouatassim, A. Sabry, Mustapha Ahlaqqach, J. Benhra\",\"doi\":\"10.1504/ijids.2020.10028225\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The present work focuses on the demand decision making problem for regional distribution centres sharing the same product families. Each centre orders quantities to be distributed from production units. Our approach suggests a biform game to maximise the benefits of each centre and minimise the end of cycle market induced supply to demand deviations. We start by an independent demand forecasting under uncertainty. Once the demand is met, the centres enter a collaboration phase where coalitions are created and products are exchanged, in order to achieve the core stability of the actual game. If not met, we try to achieve the same objectives using individual rationality through an adapted approach based on Shapley value analysis for each possible coalition.\",\"PeriodicalId\":303039,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Int. J. Inf. Decis. Sci.\",\"volume\":\"82 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-04\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Int. J. Inf. Decis. Sci.\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1504/ijids.2020.10028225\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Int. J. Inf. Decis. Sci.","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1504/ijids.2020.10028225","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A new framework using biform game for cost optimisation of distribution networks
The present work focuses on the demand decision making problem for regional distribution centres sharing the same product families. Each centre orders quantities to be distributed from production units. Our approach suggests a biform game to maximise the benefits of each centre and minimise the end of cycle market induced supply to demand deviations. We start by an independent demand forecasting under uncertainty. Once the demand is met, the centres enter a collaboration phase where coalitions are created and products are exchanged, in order to achieve the core stability of the actual game. If not met, we try to achieve the same objectives using individual rationality through an adapted approach based on Shapley value analysis for each possible coalition.