美国公民:分裂的美国:独立政治支出的实证分析

D. Spencer, A. Wood
{"title":"美国公民:分裂的美国:独立政治支出的实证分析","authors":"D. Spencer, A. Wood","doi":"10.2139/SSRN.2046878","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What effect has Citizens United v. FEC had on independent spending in American politics? Previous attempts to answer this question have focused solely on federal elections where there is no baseline for comparing changes in spending behavior. We overcome this limitation by examining the effects of Citizens United as a natural experiment on the states. Before Citizens United about half of the states banned corporate independent expenditures and thus were “treated” by the Supreme Court’s decision, which invalidated these state laws. We rely on recently released state-level data to compare spending in “treated” states to spending in the “control” states that have never banned corporate or union independent expenditures. We find that while independent expenditures increased in both treated and control states between 2006 and 2010, the increase was more than twice as large in the treated states and nearly all of the new money was funneled through nonprofit organizations and political committees where weak disclosure laws and practices protected the anonymity of the spenders. Finally, we observe that the increase in spending after Citizens United was not the product of fewer, larger expenditures as many scholars and pundits predicted, and we note that people were just as likely to make smaller expenditures (less than $400) after Citizens United as they were before. This finding is particularly striking because it cuts against the conventional wisdom of spending behavior and also challenges the logic of those who disagree with the most controversial element of the Citizens United decision – the rejection of political equality as a valid state interest.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"370 ","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-04-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"28","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending\",\"authors\":\"D. Spencer, A. Wood\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/SSRN.2046878\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"What effect has Citizens United v. FEC had on independent spending in American politics? Previous attempts to answer this question have focused solely on federal elections where there is no baseline for comparing changes in spending behavior. We overcome this limitation by examining the effects of Citizens United as a natural experiment on the states. Before Citizens United about half of the states banned corporate independent expenditures and thus were “treated” by the Supreme Court’s decision, which invalidated these state laws. We rely on recently released state-level data to compare spending in “treated” states to spending in the “control” states that have never banned corporate or union independent expenditures. We find that while independent expenditures increased in both treated and control states between 2006 and 2010, the increase was more than twice as large in the treated states and nearly all of the new money was funneled through nonprofit organizations and political committees where weak disclosure laws and practices protected the anonymity of the spenders. Finally, we observe that the increase in spending after Citizens United was not the product of fewer, larger expenditures as many scholars and pundits predicted, and we note that people were just as likely to make smaller expenditures (less than $400) after Citizens United as they were before. This finding is particularly striking because it cuts against the conventional wisdom of spending behavior and also challenges the logic of those who disagree with the most controversial element of the Citizens United decision – the rejection of political equality as a valid state interest.\",\"PeriodicalId\":280037,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal\",\"volume\":\"370 \",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-04-14\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"28\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2046878\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2046878","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 28

摘要

联合公民诉联邦选举委员会对美国政治中的独立支出有什么影响?之前回答这个问题的尝试仅仅集中在联邦选举上,在那里没有比较支出行为变化的基准。我们通过考察联合公民作为各州自然实验的影响来克服这一限制。在联合公民案之前,大约有一半的州禁止公司独立支出,因此受到最高法院裁决的“处理”,最高法院裁定这些州法律无效。我们依靠最近公布的州级数据来比较“受待遇”州的支出与从未禁止公司或工会独立支出的“控制”州的支出。我们发现,虽然2006年至2010年间,实验组和对照组的独立支出都有所增加,但实验组的增幅是对照组的两倍多,而且几乎所有的新资金都是通过非营利组织和政治委员会筹集的,这些组织和政治委员会的信息披露法律和实践薄弱,保护了支出者的匿名性。最后,我们观察到,在“公民联合案”之后,支出的增加并不像许多学者和权威人士预测的那样是支出减少、支出增加的结果,我们注意到,在“公民联合案”之后,人们与之前一样,可能会减少支出(少于400美元)。这一发现尤其引人注目,因为它推翻了有关支出行为的传统观念,也挑战了那些不同意“联合公民”案裁决中最具争议因素的人的逻辑——拒绝将政治平等视为有效的国家利益。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Citizens United, States Divided: An Empirical Analysis of Independent Political Spending
What effect has Citizens United v. FEC had on independent spending in American politics? Previous attempts to answer this question have focused solely on federal elections where there is no baseline for comparing changes in spending behavior. We overcome this limitation by examining the effects of Citizens United as a natural experiment on the states. Before Citizens United about half of the states banned corporate independent expenditures and thus were “treated” by the Supreme Court’s decision, which invalidated these state laws. We rely on recently released state-level data to compare spending in “treated” states to spending in the “control” states that have never banned corporate or union independent expenditures. We find that while independent expenditures increased in both treated and control states between 2006 and 2010, the increase was more than twice as large in the treated states and nearly all of the new money was funneled through nonprofit organizations and political committees where weak disclosure laws and practices protected the anonymity of the spenders. Finally, we observe that the increase in spending after Citizens United was not the product of fewer, larger expenditures as many scholars and pundits predicted, and we note that people were just as likely to make smaller expenditures (less than $400) after Citizens United as they were before. This finding is particularly striking because it cuts against the conventional wisdom of spending behavior and also challenges the logic of those who disagree with the most controversial element of the Citizens United decision – the rejection of political equality as a valid state interest.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信