{"title":"近似纳什均衡的查询复杂度","authors":"Y. Babichenko","doi":"10.1145/2591796.2591829","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n and a constant number of actions m. Our main result states that even for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n.","PeriodicalId":123501,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing","volume":"365 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2013-06-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"54","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Query complexity of approximate nash equilibria\",\"authors\":\"Y. Babichenko\",\"doi\":\"10.1145/2591796.2591829\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n and a constant number of actions m. Our main result states that even for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n.\",\"PeriodicalId\":123501,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing\",\"volume\":\"365 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2013-06-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"54\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1145/2591796.2591829\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the forty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/2591796.2591829","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We study the query complexity of approximate notions of Nash equilibrium in games with a large number of players n and a constant number of actions m. Our main result states that even for constant ε, the query complexity of an ε-well-supported Nash equilibrium is exponential in n.
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