安全关键系统的固件网络攻击防御

Chris W. Johnson, Maria Evangelopoulou
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引用次数: 6

摘要

在过去,在许多工业控制设备中不可能更新底层软件。工程团队不得不“拆解并替换”过时的组件。然而,固件更新的能力为使用可编程逻辑控制器(plc)、交换机、网关和桥接器以及一系列智能传感器/执行器的公司提供了显著的好处。虽然这些更新(包括在现有设备中发现漏洞时的安全补丁)可以通过物理介质分发,但它们越来越多地通过互联网连接下载。这些机制对安全关键型应用的网络安全构成了越来越大的威胁,最近乌克兰各地对安全相关基础设施的攻击就说明了这一点。本文解释了恶意软件如何在固件更新中分发。即使攻击者无法对伪装攻击所需的代码进行逆向工程,他们也可以通过强迫设备进入一个不断上传的循环来破坏设备,在这个循环中固件安装永远不会终止。在本文中,我们提出了减轻安全关键系统固件攻击风险的方法,作为确保国家关键基础设施安全的更广泛举措的一部分。技术解决方案,包括固件散列,必须通过组织措施来增强,以确保各个工厂、公司和整个安全相关行业的供应链安全。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Defending Against Firmware Cyber Attacks on Safety-Critical Systems
In the past, it was not possible to update the underlying software in many industrial control devices. Engineering teams had to “rip and replace” obsolete components. However, the ability to make firmware updates has provided significant benefits to companies who use Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), switches, gateways and bridges, as well as an array of smart sensor/actuators. While these updates — which include security patches when vulnerabilities are identified in existing devices — can be distributed by physical media, they are increasingly downloaded over Internet connections. These mechanisms pose a growing threat to the cyber security of safety-critical applications, which is illustrated by recent attacks on safety-related infrastructures across the Ukraine. This paper explains how malware can be distributed within firmware updates. Even when attackers cannot reverse engineer the code necessary to disguise their attack, they can undermine a device by forcing it into a constant upload cycle in which the firmware installation never terminates. In this paper, we present means of mitigating the risks of firmware attacks on safety-critical systems as part of wider initiatives to secure national critical infrastructures. Technical solutions, including firmware hashing, must be augmented by organizational measures to secure the supply chain within individual plants, across companies and throughout safety-related industries.
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