完美的惊喜:动态认知逻辑的新分析

Log. J. IGPL Pub Date : 2020-05-22 DOI:10.1093/jigpal/jzz031
Leander Vignero, L. Demey
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引用次数: 2

摘要

在这篇文章中,我们提出了一个新的逻辑框架来思考惊喜。这项研究不仅旨在更好地理解、建模和预测人类行为,而且还试图为实现人工代理提供工具。此外,这些人工智能体也应该能够像人类一样从惊喜中获得同样的认知收益。我们首先讨论关于命题惊奇的主流文献,并探讨其缺点。这些缺点既有经验上的,也有概念上的。接下来,我们基于认知利益问题的概念,提出了所有这些系统问题的哲学解决方案。最后,我们给出了一个思考惊喜的正式框架。更具体地说,我们开发了一种概率动态认知逻辑(称为$\mathcal{SURPRISE!}$),它成功地形式化了相关的哲学概念。这将通过基于拓扑的问题管理系统来完成。作为额外的好处,额外的表达能力使我们能够捕获更丰富的各种场景,并且还可以对所述场景进行更仔细的分析。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The perfect surprise: a new analysis in dynamic epistemic logic
In this article, we present a new logical framework to think about surprise. This research does not just aim to better understand, model and predict human behaviour, but also attempts to provide tools for implementing artificial agents. Moreover, these artificial agents should then also be able to reap the same epistemic benefits from surprise as humans do. We start by discussing the dominant literature regarding propositional surprise and explore its shortcomings. These shortcomings are of both an empirical and a conceptual nature. Next, we propose a philosophical solution to the problems that ail these systems, based on the notion of issue of epistemic interest. Finally, we give a formal framework to think about surprise. More specifically, we develop a probabilistic dynamic epistemic logic (called $\mathcal{SURPRISE!}$) that succeeds at formalizing the relevant philosophical concepts. This will be done through an issue management system grounded in topology. As an added bonus, the additional expressive power allows us to capture a richer variety of scenarios, and it also enables a more careful analysis of said scenarios.
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