The Christian Structure of Politics: On the "De regno" of Thomas Aquinas by William McCormick (review)

in a potential or actual state, and it is when both are actual that they become the same: “the act of understanding (noēsis) is one with the [actual] object of understanding (nooumenon)” (Metaphys. 12.9.1075a4-5 [my translations]). This presents a problem for Kelsey’s general claim that to be intelligible is to be an activity of intelligence. Second, Aristotle’s frequent remark that we should start from what is “poorly knowable” (phaulōs gnōston) but knowable to us and proceed to the knowledge of what is knowable “in itself by nature” implies that objects are intelligible in an objective sense alien to Kelsey’s interpretation (see Metaphys. 7.3.1029b3-11; this is quoted by Kelsey on page 156 but an important part is missing). To sum up, Kelsey stakes out an original interpretation and defends it forcefully. Even those who are not convinced will gain valuable insights, especially concerning Aristotle’s concept of measure and his emphasis on intelligence as active process rather a mere passive reception of forms. It is a must read for any scholar of Aristotle’s epistemology.