Rorty’s Recontextualization and Davidson’s Principle of Charity

The criticism of epistemology undertaken by R. Rorty in the book “Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature” is based on the concept of knowledge by J. Dewey of ‘research’ as an evolutionary change of beliefs. Rorty identifies two components of this process: the description of the transition from the old belief system to the new, and the development of a new system. The first is closely related to the problems of Kuhn’s paradigm shift, and the second to Gadamer’s hermeneutic tools. Both of these are intertwined in Rorty’s subsequent philosophy, undergoing changes under the influence of a pragmatic critique of the dualisms of Western philosophy. But since hermeneutics is only one of the means of mastering new beliefs, Rorty introduces a more general concept of ‘recontextualization’. This step requires a revision of the place of Kuhn and Gadamer in late Rorty’s philosophy. In relation to Kuhn, this was expressed in the rejection of Kuhn’s privilege of the natural sciences, while the role of Gadamer’s hermeneutics as an interpretation has suffered more damage. Rorty denies the universality of hermeneutics, addressing a rebuke to those philosophers whose interpretation comes to the fore, or in Rorty’s words, ‘is inscribed on the banners of the philosophical movement’ - Dilthey, Gadamer and Taylor. Recontextualization instead of hermeneutics is implemented by Rorty in the form of a translation concept. Rorty does not accept Quine’s concept of radical translation as an expression of extreme skepticism in understanding someone else’s linguistic framework, and accepts Davidson’s Principle of Charity, which emphasizes interpretation with the achievement of ‘maximizing’ meaning and ‘optimizing’ communication. As a consequence, Rorty uses the possibility of completely abandoning ontology as a tool for describing the world and teeters on the verge of adopting a purely ‘linguistic’ vision of reality.