DDR2、DDR3 SDRAM冷启动攻击

Simon Lindenlauf, Hans Höfken, Marko Schuba
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引用次数: 17

摘要

冷启动攻击提供了一种获取计算机易失性内存转储的方法,即使计算机是锁定的。这样的转储可以用来重建硬盘加密密钥,并获得Bit locker或True crypt加密驱动器的内容。如果获得的转储包含错误,这甚至是可能的。冷启动攻击已在DDR1和DDR2 SDRAM上成功演示。他们也尝试过使用各种类型的设备在DDR3 SDRAM上,但迄今为止所有的尝试都失败了。在本文中,我们描述了一种不同的硬件设置,它也适用于DDR3 SDRAM。使用此设置,数字取证调查人员将有可能从使用DDR3 SDRAM的新机器中恢复密钥。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cold Boot Attacks on DDR2 and DDR3 SDRAM
Cold boot attacks provide a means to obtain a dump of a computer's volatile memory even if the machine is locked. Such a dump can be used to reconstruct hard disk encryption keys and get access to the content of Bit locker or True crypt encrypted drives. This is even possible, if the obtained dump contains errors. Cold boot attacks have been demonstrated successfully on DDR1 and DDR2 SDRAM. They have also been tried on DDR3 SDRAM using various types of equipment but all attempts have failed so far. In this paper we describe a different hardware setup which turns out to work for DDR3 SDRAM as well. Using this setup it will be possible for digital forensic investigators to recover keys from newer machines that use DDR3 SDRAM.
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