{"title":"《禁止生物武器公约》的灰色地带:确定生物武器定义的模糊界限","authors":"Jennifer Wissinger","doi":"10.1515/jbbbl-2015-0006","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The member states bound by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have committed to not produce, stock pile, or use biological weapons, but finding the line between what is a biological weapon and what is justified by “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” is difficult with the broad wording of the convention. In a world of quickly emerging technology, the gray area created by the broad exceptions to what constitutes a BWC biological weapon produces ever-changing security risks and public policy considerations. Despite the BWC’s attempt to strengthen prohibition on biological weapons of prior agreements, a large exception is carved out for the three justified uses, which hinges on the intent and purpose of the actor. The three permitted purposes are not defined, and there is no objective test for determining the intention of the actor.","PeriodicalId":415930,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The BWC Gray Area: Locating the Blurry Line of Defining Biological Weapons\",\"authors\":\"Jennifer Wissinger\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/jbbbl-2015-0006\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Abstract The member states bound by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have committed to not produce, stock pile, or use biological weapons, but finding the line between what is a biological weapon and what is justified by “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” is difficult with the broad wording of the convention. In a world of quickly emerging technology, the gray area created by the broad exceptions to what constitutes a BWC biological weapon produces ever-changing security risks and public policy considerations. Despite the BWC’s attempt to strengthen prohibition on biological weapons of prior agreements, a large exception is carved out for the three justified uses, which hinges on the intent and purpose of the actor. The three permitted purposes are not defined, and there is no objective test for determining the intention of the actor.\",\"PeriodicalId\":415930,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2015-0006\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Biosecurity, Biosafety, and Biodefense Law","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1515/jbbbl-2015-0006","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The BWC Gray Area: Locating the Blurry Line of Defining Biological Weapons
Abstract The member states bound by the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) have committed to not produce, stock pile, or use biological weapons, but finding the line between what is a biological weapon and what is justified by “prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes” is difficult with the broad wording of the convention. In a world of quickly emerging technology, the gray area created by the broad exceptions to what constitutes a BWC biological weapon produces ever-changing security risks and public policy considerations. Despite the BWC’s attempt to strengthen prohibition on biological weapons of prior agreements, a large exception is carved out for the three justified uses, which hinges on the intent and purpose of the actor. The three permitted purposes are not defined, and there is no objective test for determining the intention of the actor.