{"title":"范德皮特测试:宪法承认还是宪法限制","authors":"A. Kent","doi":"10.18357/TAR32201211640","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This article uses the case of R. v. Van der Peet to critically analyze the role of language in Section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution in perpetuating asymmetrical power dynamics within the framework of colonialism. In defining which practices are protected in the form of Indigenous rights under Section 35(1), the courts have imposed a two-stage test called the Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test or Van der Peet Test. This test stipulates three criteria; the practice must: originate from \"pre-contact\", be \"distinctive\", and conform or \"reconcile\" with state sovereignty. This article demonstrates how these criteria hinder the development of Indigenous rights, restrict the scope of such rights, and marginalize Indigenous peoples in Canadian society. Analyzing the role of the deliberative wording of this constitutional order reveals a foundation for contemporary colonialism and oppression, whereby colonial power relations are facilitated and secured by antiquated, ethnocentric ideals upheld by the Judiciary. Exposing the illegitimacy embedded within the State's uninhibited, exclusive sovereignty directs this discussion to the suggestion that the State lacks the authority to grant Indigenous rights. This article concludes with the argument that, as the original inhabitants of this land, Indigenous Nations possess the inherent extra-constitutional right to self-determination that can only be achieved through self-affirmation.","PeriodicalId":143772,"journal":{"name":"The Arbutus Review","volume":"12 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-12-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Van der Peet Test Constitutional Recognition or Constitutional Restriction\",\"authors\":\"A. Kent\",\"doi\":\"10.18357/TAR32201211640\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This article uses the case of R. v. Van der Peet to critically analyze the role of language in Section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution in perpetuating asymmetrical power dynamics within the framework of colonialism. In defining which practices are protected in the form of Indigenous rights under Section 35(1), the courts have imposed a two-stage test called the Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test or Van der Peet Test. This test stipulates three criteria; the practice must: originate from \\\"pre-contact\\\", be \\\"distinctive\\\", and conform or \\\"reconcile\\\" with state sovereignty. This article demonstrates how these criteria hinder the development of Indigenous rights, restrict the scope of such rights, and marginalize Indigenous peoples in Canadian society. Analyzing the role of the deliberative wording of this constitutional order reveals a foundation for contemporary colonialism and oppression, whereby colonial power relations are facilitated and secured by antiquated, ethnocentric ideals upheld by the Judiciary. Exposing the illegitimacy embedded within the State's uninhibited, exclusive sovereignty directs this discussion to the suggestion that the State lacks the authority to grant Indigenous rights. This article concludes with the argument that, as the original inhabitants of this land, Indigenous Nations possess the inherent extra-constitutional right to self-determination that can only be achieved through self-affirmation.\",\"PeriodicalId\":143772,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"The Arbutus Review\",\"volume\":\"12 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-12-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"The Arbutus Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.18357/TAR32201211640\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Arbutus Review","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.18357/TAR32201211640","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
摘要
本文以R. v. Van der Peet一案为例,批判性地分析了加拿大宪法第35(1)条中语言在殖民主义框架内延续不对称权力动态方面的作用。在根据第35(1)条确定哪些做法以土著权利的形式受到保护时,法院实施了一项两阶段测试,称为独特文化积分测试或Van der Peet测试。该测试规定了三个标准;实践必须:源于“前接触”,“有特色”,符合或“调和”国家主权。本文展示了这些标准如何阻碍土著权利的发展,限制了这些权利的范围,并使土著人民在加拿大社会中被边缘化。分析这一宪法秩序的审议措辞的作用,揭示了当代殖民主义和压迫的基础,在这种基础上,殖民权力关系是由司法机构所支持的过时的、种族中心主义的理想促进和保障的。揭露国家不受约束的排他性主权所隐含的非法性,将讨论引向国家缺乏授予土著权利的权力的建议。本文最后的论点是,土著民族作为这片土地的原始居民,拥有固有的宪法之外的自决权利,这种权利只能通过自我肯定来实现。
The Van der Peet Test Constitutional Recognition or Constitutional Restriction
This article uses the case of R. v. Van der Peet to critically analyze the role of language in Section 35(1) of the Canadian Constitution in perpetuating asymmetrical power dynamics within the framework of colonialism. In defining which practices are protected in the form of Indigenous rights under Section 35(1), the courts have imposed a two-stage test called the Integral to a Distinctive Culture Test or Van der Peet Test. This test stipulates three criteria; the practice must: originate from "pre-contact", be "distinctive", and conform or "reconcile" with state sovereignty. This article demonstrates how these criteria hinder the development of Indigenous rights, restrict the scope of such rights, and marginalize Indigenous peoples in Canadian society. Analyzing the role of the deliberative wording of this constitutional order reveals a foundation for contemporary colonialism and oppression, whereby colonial power relations are facilitated and secured by antiquated, ethnocentric ideals upheld by the Judiciary. Exposing the illegitimacy embedded within the State's uninhibited, exclusive sovereignty directs this discussion to the suggestion that the State lacks the authority to grant Indigenous rights. This article concludes with the argument that, as the original inhabitants of this land, Indigenous Nations possess the inherent extra-constitutional right to self-determination that can only be achieved through self-affirmation.