Allen N. Berger, Simona Nistor, S. Ongena, S. Tsyplakov
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Catch, Restrict, and Release: The Real Story of Bank Bailouts
Bank bailouts are not the "one-shot" events commonly described in the literature. These bailouts are instead dynamic processes in which regulators "catch" financially distressed banks; "restrict" their activities over time; and "release" the banks from restrictions at sufficiently healthy capital ratios. The "catch-restrict-release" approach is a global phenomenon, which we document using hand-collected data on capital injection and debt guarantee bailouts in the European Union (EU) over 2008-2014. We present a dynamic theoretical model of socially-optimizing regulators engaging in "catch-restrict-release" capital injection and debt guarantee bailouts, and empirically test model predictions. Observed EU bailouts are qualitatively consistent with optimizing behavior.