捕捉、限制和释放:银行救助的真实故事

Allen N. Berger, Simona Nistor, S. Ongena, S. Tsyplakov
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引用次数: 10

摘要

银行救助不是文献中通常描述的“一次性”事件。相反,这些纾困是监管机构“捕捉”财务困境银行的动态过程;随着时间的推移“限制”他们的活动;以足够健康的资本比率“释放”银行的限制。“捕获-限制-释放”方法是一种全球现象,我们使用2008-2014年欧盟(EU)资本注入和债务担保救助的手工收集数据对其进行了记录。我们提出了一个社会优化监管机构参与“捕获-限制-释放”注资和债务担保救助的动态理论模型,并对模型预测进行了实证检验。观察到的欧盟救助在质量上与优化行为是一致的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Catch, Restrict, and Release: The Real Story of Bank Bailouts
Bank bailouts are not the "one-shot" events commonly described in the literature. These bailouts are instead dynamic processes in which regulators "catch" financially distressed banks; "restrict" their activities over time; and "release" the banks from restrictions at sufficiently healthy capital ratios. The "catch-restrict-release" approach is a global phenomenon, which we document using hand-collected data on capital injection and debt guarantee bailouts in the European Union (EU) over 2008-2014. We present a dynamic theoretical model of socially-optimizing regulators engaging in "catch-restrict-release" capital injection and debt guarantee bailouts, and empirically test model predictions. Observed EU bailouts are qualitatively consistent with optimizing behavior.
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