DVFSspy:使用动态电压和频率缩放作为多程序的隐蔽通道

Pengfei Qiu, Dongsheng Wang, Yongqiang Lyu, Gang Qu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

动态电压频率标度(DVFS)是一种广泛应用于现代系统的低功耗技术。在本文中,我们发现了DVFS技术实现中的一个漏洞,该漏洞允许我们测量处理器在用户空间中的频率。通过利用此漏洞,我们成功地在商用英特尔平台上实现了一个隐蔽通道,并证明隐蔽通道可以达到28.41bps的吞吐量,错误率为0.53%。这项工作表明,处理器的硬件信息被特权内核模块无意中泄露到用户空间可能会造成安全风险。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
DVFSspy: Using Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling as a Covert Channel for Multiple Procedures
Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) is a widely deployed low-power technology in modern systems. In this paper, we discover a vulnerability in the implementation of the DVFS technology that allows us to measure the processor's frequency in the userspace. By exploiting this vulnerability, we successfully implement a covert channel on the commercial Intel platform and demonstrate that the covert channel can reach a throughput of 28.41bps with an error rate of 0.53%. This work indicates that the processor's hardware information that is unintentionally leaked to the userspace by the privileged kernel modules may cause security risks.
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