{"title":"葛底斯堡日出时刻(1863年7月2日","authors":"D. Shultz, Scott L. Mingus","doi":"10.1353/GET.2017.0001","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The Evening of July 1 Missed Opportunities and Fresh Planning During the predawn sunrise hours of July 2, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the newly appointed commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, began considering changing the tactics they had already planned and set in motion— Lee, the previous evening and Meade, shortly aft er midnight. Lee’s inclination this cloudy Th ursday morning was to strike the enemy as early as possible, “if they were still there,” while Meade repositioned his defensive perimeter aft er a thorough examination along his westfacing front. It was nearly dawn when both army commanders reconsidered their initial general plans, this change of tactics coming aft er top subordinates presented diff erent ideas as to how to handle the imminent battle. Th ose senior offi cers trying to infl uence their respective leaders included Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, commanding the Confederate First Army Corps, and Union Twelft h Corps commander Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. Th eir disingenuous attitudes and problematic demeanors at this early hour proved questionable, with the latter’s demands somewhat more strategically practical than Longstreet’s. Th eir continuous disagreeing and prodding with their superiors would force Lee and Meade","PeriodicalId":268075,"journal":{"name":"Gettysburg Magazine","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-02-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Sunrise Hours at Gettysburg, July 2, 1863\",\"authors\":\"D. Shultz, Scott L. Mingus\",\"doi\":\"10.1353/GET.2017.0001\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The Evening of July 1 Missed Opportunities and Fresh Planning During the predawn sunrise hours of July 2, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the newly appointed commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, began considering changing the tactics they had already planned and set in motion— Lee, the previous evening and Meade, shortly aft er midnight. Lee’s inclination this cloudy Th ursday morning was to strike the enemy as early as possible, “if they were still there,” while Meade repositioned his defensive perimeter aft er a thorough examination along his westfacing front. It was nearly dawn when both army commanders reconsidered their initial general plans, this change of tactics coming aft er top subordinates presented diff erent ideas as to how to handle the imminent battle. Th ose senior offi cers trying to infl uence their respective leaders included Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, commanding the Confederate First Army Corps, and Union Twelft h Corps commander Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. Th eir disingenuous attitudes and problematic demeanors at this early hour proved questionable, with the latter’s demands somewhat more strategically practical than Longstreet’s. Th eir continuous disagreeing and prodding with their superiors would force Lee and Meade\",\"PeriodicalId\":268075,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Gettysburg Magazine\",\"volume\":\"13 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-02-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Gettysburg Magazine\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2017.0001\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Gettysburg Magazine","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/GET.2017.0001","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The Evening of July 1 Missed Opportunities and Fresh Planning During the predawn sunrise hours of July 2, 1863, Gen. Robert E. Lee, commanding the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, and Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, the newly appointed commander of the Union Army of the Potomac, began considering changing the tactics they had already planned and set in motion— Lee, the previous evening and Meade, shortly aft er midnight. Lee’s inclination this cloudy Th ursday morning was to strike the enemy as early as possible, “if they were still there,” while Meade repositioned his defensive perimeter aft er a thorough examination along his westfacing front. It was nearly dawn when both army commanders reconsidered their initial general plans, this change of tactics coming aft er top subordinates presented diff erent ideas as to how to handle the imminent battle. Th ose senior offi cers trying to infl uence their respective leaders included Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, commanding the Confederate First Army Corps, and Union Twelft h Corps commander Maj. Gen. Henry W. Slocum. Th eir disingenuous attitudes and problematic demeanors at this early hour proved questionable, with the latter’s demands somewhat more strategically practical than Longstreet’s. Th eir continuous disagreeing and prodding with their superiors would force Lee and Meade