应用中的魔鬼:手机通知系统中的漏洞和用户隐私暴露

Jiadong Lou, Xiaohan Zhang, Yihe Zhang, Xinghua Li, Xu Yuan, Ning Zhang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

随着推送通知在移动设备上的广泛采用,这种新的消息传递模式已经在各种应用程序中普及开来。随着它的广泛采用,潜在的安全风险和隐私暴露问题引起了公众对其巨大社会影响的关注。本文首次尝试开发移动通知生态系统。通过剖析其结构要素和实现过程,对移动通知从平台注册到消息传递的完整流程进行全面的漏洞分析。同时,对于隐私暴露,我们首先通过提出一个三级检查方法来检查隐私政策合规性的实施情况,以指导我们的分析。然后,从文档分析、应用程序网络流量研究到静态分析,自上而下的方法揭示了已发布应用程序中的非法数据收集行为。此外,我们还揭示了通知监视导致的潜在隐私推断。为了支持我们的分析,我们对12个最流行的通知平台进行了实证研究,并对30,000多个应用程序进行了静态分析。我们发现:1)六个平台要么提供模棱两可的密钥命名规则,要么提供易受攻击的消息传递api;2)隐私政策合规实施要么停滞在文档阶段(12个平台中的8个),要么从未在应用程序中实施,导致数十亿用户遭受隐私暴露;3)一些应用程序可以暗中监控发送给其他应用程序的通知消息,可能会产生用户隐私推断风险。我们的研究提出了对更好的移动通知部署法规的迫切需求。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Devils in Your Apps: Vulnerabilities and User Privacy Exposure in Mobile Notification Systems
Witnessing the blooming adoption of push notifications on mobile devices, this new message delivery paradigm has become pervasive in diverse applications. Accompanying with its broad adoption, the potential security risks and privacy exposure issues raise public concerns regarding its great social impacts. This paper conducts the first attempt to exploit the mobile notification ecosystem. By dissecting its structural elements and implementation process, a comprehensive vulnerability analysis is conducted towards the complete flow of mobile notification from platform enrollment to messaging. Meanwhile, for privacy exposure, we first examine the implementation of privacy policy compliance by proposing a three-level inspection approach to guide our analysis. Then, our top-down methods from documentation analysis, application network traffic study, to static analysis expose the illicit data collection behaviors in released applications. In addition, we uncover the potential privacy inference resulted from the notification monitoring. To support our analysis, we conduct empirical studies on 12 most popular notification platforms and perform static analysis over 30,000+ applications. We discover: 1) six platforms either provide ambiguous KEY naming rules or offer vulnerable messaging APIs; 2) privacy policy compliance implementations are either stagnated at the documentation stages (8 of 12 platforms) or never implemented in apps, resulting in billions of users suffering from privacy exposure; and 3) some apps can stealthily monitor notification messages delivering to other apps, potentially incurring user privacy inference risks. Our study raises the urgent demand for better regulations of mobile notification deployment.
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