采购服务供应商隐性返利与虚报管理机制设计

Xiaoshuai Fan, Ying‐ju Chen, Christopher S. Tang
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引用次数: 4

摘要

问题定义:当通过采购服务提供商(PSP)采购时,PSP经常从发展中国家不道德的制造商那里收取回扣(作为推荐费),这些回扣对零售商是“隐藏的”。认识到PSP有强烈的动机向不道德的制造商征求报价,我们研究了这样一种情况:零售商坚持从零售商指定的制造商那里征求报价,而从PSP选择的不道德的制造商那里单独征求报价。然而,当指定的制造商是有道德的,PSP就有动机从这个有道德的制造商那里抬高报价,以帮助不道德的制造商获胜。面对这种情况,零售商是否有控制隐性返利的机制?学术/实践相关性:隐性回扣问题是全球供应链实践中的“已知秘密”。此外,隐性退税增加了美国进口商的关税,因为海关对美国进口商品进行估价的首次销售规则。因此,有必要了解隐藏回扣的含义,并控制这种不道德的做法。方法:为了规避隐性回扣和报价膨胀的问题,我们开发了一种确定性的、激励兼容的机制,该机制基于简单的选择规则(用于选择制造商)和附带服务费(作为PSP提供服务的奖励)。结果:我们的最优机制产生了激励(1)阻止PSP夸大道德制造商提交的报价,(2)减少隐性回扣的发生率,(3)显著降低零售商的采购成本和相应的进口税。更重要的是,相对于“最低报价获胜”的选择规则,当隐性回扣低于一定阈值时,零售商和服务提供商的最优机制是帕累托改进。此外,我们将我们的分析扩展到以下情况:(1)零售商不确定指定制造商是否符合道德标准,(2)零售商不知道隐藏回扣的确切价值(但它遵循两点分布),以及(3)零售商可能在正式合同之前与其指定制造商核实报价。我们还探讨了随机激励兼容机制的情况下,其中的处罚是不可执行或可执行的。管理启示:当发展中国家的执法不一致时,零售商应该警惕隐藏回扣的存在及其影响。我们提供了一种简单的机制,零售商可以考虑作为一种实用的方法来阻止PSP夸大某些报价,并将隐藏的回扣置于控制之下。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mechanism Design for Managing Hidden Rebates and Inflated Quotes of a Procurement Service Provider
Problem definition: When sourcing through a procurement service provider (PSP), the PSP often collects rebates from unethical manufacturers in developing countries (as referral fees) that are “hidden” from the retailers. Recognizing that a PSP has a strong incentive to solicit quotes from unethical manufacturers, we examine a situation in which the retailer insists on soliciting a quote from a manufacturer designated by the retailer and a separate quote from an unethical manufacturer selected by the PSP. However, when the designated manufacturer is ethical, the PSP has an incentive to inflate the quote from this ethical manufacturer in order to help the unethical manufacturer to win. Facing this situation, is there a mechanism for the retailer to control hidden rebates? Academic/practical relevance: The issue of hidden rebates is a “known secret” in global supply chain practice. Also, hidden rebates increase the customs duty for U.S. importers because of the first sales rule for customs valuation of U.S. imports. Therefore, there is a need to understand the implications of hidden rebates and to control this unethical practice. Methodology: To circumvent the issue of hidden rebates and quote inflations, we develop a deterministic, incentive-compatible mechanism that is based on a simple selection rule (for selecting a manufacturer) and a contingent service fee (as a reward for the service provided by the PSP). Results: Our optimal mechanism creates incentives to (1) deter the PSP from inflating the quote submitted from the ethical manufacturer, (2) reduce the incidence of hidden rebates, and (3) reduce the retailer’s procurement cost and the corresponding import tax significantly. More importantly, relative to the “lowest quote wins” selection rule, the optimal mechanism is Pareto-improving for the retailer and the service provider when the hidden rebate is below a certain threshold. Furthermore, we extend our analysis to the case in which (1) the retailer is not sure whether the designated manufacturer is ethical or not, (2) the retailer does not know the exact value of hidden rebate (but it follows a two-point distribution), and (3) the retailer may verify the quote with its designated manufacturer before a formal contract. We also explore the stochastic incentive-compatible mechanism for the cases in which the penalty is unenforceable or enforceable. Managerial implications: When law enforcement is inconsistent in developing countries, retailers should beware of the existence and implications of hidden rebates. We provide a simple mechanism that a retailer can consider as a practical way to deter the PSP from inflating certain quotes and put hidden rebates under control.
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