认证机构竞争及审核职系

Food Laws Pub Date : 2019-04-13 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3371279
Yuqing Zheng, Talia Bar
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引用次数: 0

摘要

第三方认证机构审核公司以确定是否符合标准。我们引入了一个认证机构之间寡头垄断竞争的模型,表明认证机构竞争程度越高,评级越高。我们使用来自英国零售协会食品计划(食品制造商的领先国际食品安全标准)的面板数据对这一假设进行了实证检验,并发现认证机构之间竞争程度越高,审核等级越高的证据。制造商第一次认证的等级较低,这表明认证可能会改善食品安全实践。拥有多个认证站点的生产者获得更高的等级。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Certifier Competition and Audit Grades
Third party certification bodies audit companies to determine compliance with standards. We introduce a model of oligopoly competition between certification bodies, showing that a higher degree of certification body competition results in higher grades. We empirically test this hypothesis using panel data from the British Retail Consortium food program, a leading international food safety standard for food manufacturers, and find evidence that a higher degree of competition between certification bodies is associated with higher audit grades. Grades are lower the first time manufacturers certify, suggesting certification may improve food safety practices. Producers with multiple certified sites obtain higher grades.
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