最优增长税

M. Davidsson
{"title":"最优增长税","authors":"M. Davidsson","doi":"10.5430/RWE.V3N1P35","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Government usually tends to have two options. They can either pursue a tax revenue maximizing strategy or a growth maximizing strategy. The two approached do not necessarily go hand in hand. This paper derives and empirically estimates a simple laissez faire optimal taxation model from the perspective of economic growth. The finding is that governments tend to systematically over tax the economy which leads to suboptimal allocations. Politicians tend to prefer high taxation over a cut in public spending i.e. a reduction in public sector jobs.","PeriodicalId":379216,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","volume":"2015 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-03-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Optimal Growth Taxation\",\"authors\":\"M. Davidsson\",\"doi\":\"10.5430/RWE.V3N1P35\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Government usually tends to have two options. They can either pursue a tax revenue maximizing strategy or a growth maximizing strategy. The two approached do not necessarily go hand in hand. This paper derives and empirically estimates a simple laissez faire optimal taxation model from the perspective of economic growth. The finding is that governments tend to systematically over tax the economy which leads to suboptimal allocations. Politicians tend to prefer high taxation over a cut in public spending i.e. a reduction in public sector jobs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":379216,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"2015 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-03-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5430/RWE.V3N1P35\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Public Spending (Comparative) (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5430/RWE.V3N1P35","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7

摘要

政府通常有两种选择。他们既可以追求税收最大化战略,也可以追求增长最大化战略。这两种方式并不一定是齐头并进的。本文从经济增长的角度推导并实证估计了一个简单的自由放任最优税收模型。研究发现,政府倾向于系统性地对经济过度征税,这导致了次优分配。政客们倾向于高税收,而不是削减公共开支,即减少公共部门的工作岗位。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal Growth Taxation
Government usually tends to have two options. They can either pursue a tax revenue maximizing strategy or a growth maximizing strategy. The two approached do not necessarily go hand in hand. This paper derives and empirically estimates a simple laissez faire optimal taxation model from the perspective of economic growth. The finding is that governments tend to systematically over tax the economy which leads to suboptimal allocations. Politicians tend to prefer high taxation over a cut in public spending i.e. a reduction in public sector jobs.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信