速记术:后斯诺登密码学

Qiang Tang, M. Yung
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引用次数: 9

摘要

本教程将对{\em窃密术}进行系统概述:从黑盒加密实现中下意识地窃取信息;{\em cliptography}:通过规范重新设计(不改变底层算法)来遏制盗窃攻击力量的防御机制。尽管现代密码学的发展历史值得称赞,但在实践中,应用密码学工具可靠地提供安全性和隐私性是出了名的困难。一个基本的实际挑战仍然存在,即在不明确信任基本安全基础设施背后的算法和实现的情况下保证安全和隐私。虽然使用加密原语的对抗性实现的危险似乎是显而易见的,但这种攻击的后果却令人惊讶地可怕:事实证明,在广泛的情况下,加密算法(确定性和随机化)的对抗性实现可能会泄露私人信息,同时产生的输出在统计上与忠实实现无法区分。《窃国学》正式研究了这种攻击。斯诺登的揭露向我们展示了,即使传统的密码学似乎被用来保护互联网通信,在没有考虑到窃密术的情况下,安全和隐私是如何大规模丧失的。我们将首先解释上述盗窃攻击如何在各种环境中进行。然后,我们将介绍几种简单但严格的免疫策略,这些策略受到民间传说实践智慧的启发,以保护不同的算法免受实现颠覆。这些策略可以应用于确保大多数基本加密原语(如PRG、数字签名、公钥加密)的安全性,以防止相应的盗窃攻击。我们的新设计原则可能建议新的标准化方法,帮助减少颠覆实现的威胁。我们也希望我们的教程能够激发社区明智的努力,进一步解决开始时提到的基本挑战。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Cliptography: Post-Snowden Cryptography
This tutorial will present a systematic overview of {\em kleptography}: stealing information subliminally from black-box cryptographic implementations; and {\em cliptography}: defending mechanisms that clip the power of kleptographic attacks via specification re-designs (without altering the underlying algorithms). Despite the laudatory history of development of modern cryptography, applying cryptographic tools to reliably provide security and privacy in practice is notoriously difficult. One fundamental practical challenge, guaranteeing security and privacy without explicit trust in the algorithms and implementations that underlie basic security infrastructure, remains. While the dangers of entertaining adversarial implementation of cryptographic primitives seem obvious, the ramifications of such attacks are surprisingly dire: it turns out that -- in wide generality -- adversarial implementations of cryptographic (both deterministic and randomized) algorithms may leak private information while producing output that is statistically indistinguishable from that of a faithful implementation. Such attacks were formally studied in Kleptography. Snowden revelations has shown us how security and privacy can be lost at a very large scale even when traditional cryptography seems to be used to protect Internet communication, when Kleptography was not taken into consideration. We will first explain how the above-mentioned Kleptographic attacks can be carried out in various settings. We will then introduce several simple but rigorous immunizing strategies that were inspired by folklore practical wisdoms to protect different algorithms from implementation subversion. Those strategies can be applied to ensure security of most of the fundamental cryptographic primitives such as PRG, digital signatures, public key encryptions against kleptographic attacks when they are implemented accordingly. Our new design principles may suggest new standardization methods that help reducing the threats of subverted implementation. We also hope our tutorial to stimulate a community-wise efforts to further tackle the fundamental challenge mentioned at the beginning.
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