{"title":"通过特许合同分担风险","authors":"P. Scandizzo, Marco Ventura","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1618294","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy.","PeriodicalId":163321,"journal":{"name":"TransportRN: Financing of Transportation (Topic)","volume":"49 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2010-05-31","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"33","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Sharing Risk Through Concession Contracts\",\"authors\":\"P. Scandizzo, Marco Ventura\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1618294\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":163321,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"TransportRN: Financing of Transportation (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"49 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2010-05-31\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"33\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"TransportRN: Financing of Transportation (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1618294\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"TransportRN: Financing of Transportation (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1618294","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In this paper we model concession contracts between a public and a private party, under dynamic uncertainty arising both from the volatility of the cash flow generated by the project and by the strategic behaviour of the two parties. Under these conditions we derive three notions of equilibrium price and apply the model to a case study for one of the most important concession contracts in Italy.
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