自私网络中的K-anycast游戏

Weizhao Wang, Xiangyang Li, O. Frieder
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引用次数: 11

摘要

传统上,大多数网络路由协议都假定每个网络终端或链路为其他终端或链路转发数据没有任何偏差。然而,当终端或链路由自私的个人用户拥有时,情况可能就不一样了,这些用户总是试图最大化自己的利益,而不是忠实地遵循规定的协议。在本文中,我们提出了一种新的路由协议,称为k-任播路由,即使网络链路(或终端或两者)是自私的,它也能很好地工作。在我们的协议中,源节点首先从一组可能的接收器中找到一个跨越k个接收器的树,并支付中继链路以补偿它们的成本。我们证明了每条中继链路都遵循路由协议:当它声明其实际成本时,它的利润最大化
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
k-anycast game in selfish networks
Conventionally, the majority of network routing protocols assume that every network terminal or link forwards data for others without any deviation. However, this may not be true when the terminals or links are owned by individual selfish users, who always tries to maximize their own benefits instead of faithfully following a prescribed protocol. In this paper, we propose a new routing protocol, called k-anycast routing, that works well even if network links (or terminals or both) are selfish. In our protocol, the source node first finds a tree that spans k receivers out of a set of possible receivers and pay the relay links to compensate their costs. We prove that every relay link follows the routing protocol: it maximizes its profit when it declares its actual cost
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