控股股东性质、高管薪酬与投资效率:来自中国资本市场的数据

2019 International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME) Pub Date : 2019-12-01 DOI:10.1109/ICEMME49371.2019.00117

Ke Zhang, Seon Yoo Ji, Xujun Zhang

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引用次数: 1

摘要

低效投资是我国上市公司普遍存在的现象。非国有上市公司的非有效投资行为多于国有上市公司。地方控股上市公司的投资效率低下问题也比中央控股上市公司更为严重。高管货币薪酬对上市公司过度投资和投资不足均有显著抑制作用。笔者发现国有上市公司比非国有上市公司具有更大的抑制效应，中央控股上市公司比地方控股上市公司具有更大的抑制效应。中央控股上市公司对过度投资行为的抑制作用大于对不足投资行为的抑制作用。股权报酬与过度投资和投资不足呈负相关，但检验结果不显著。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The Nature of Controlling Shareholders, Executive Compensation and Investment Efficiency: Data from Chinese Capital Markets

Inefficient investment is a common phenomenon in Chinese listed companies. And the non-efficient investment behavior of non-state-owned listed companies is more than that of state-owned listed companies. Also the inefficient investment of locally controlled listed companies is more serious than that of centrally controlled listed companies. Executive monetary compensation has a significant inhibitory effect on over-investment and under-investment in listed companies. The author finds that State-owned listed companies have greater inhibitory effects than non-state-owned listed companies and the centrally controlled listed company has a greater inhibitory effect than the locally controlled listed listed company. Centrally controlled listed companies have a greater inhibitory effect on over-investment than in under-investment behavior. Equity compensation is negatively correlated with over-investment and under-investment, but the test results are not significant.

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来源期刊

2019 International Conference on Economic Management and Model Engineering (ICEMME)

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