大金字塔之谜

R. Morck
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引用次数: 75

摘要

除了美国、英国、德国和日本以外,大型金字塔家族控制的商业集团是主要的商业组织形式。由数十家,甚至数百家上市或未上市公司组成的大型金字塔集团,将许多国家大型商业部门的大片管理权掌握在少数最富有的家族手中。这些结构似乎可以替代处于快速早期工业化阶段的经济体中脆弱的市场制度。它们还可以代替软弱的政府协调“大推动”增长计划,同时建立众多相互依存的项目。然而,在发达国家或增长缓慢的发展中国家,这种作用并不明显,在这些国家,这种结构似乎容易出现代理问题和政治寻租。如果规模足够大,它们还可能使治理不当的风险成为系统性的,而不是企业特有的,从而加剧经济波动。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Riddle of the Great Pyramids
Large pyramidal family controlled business groups are the predominant form of business organization outside America, Britain, Germany, and Japan. Large pyramidal groups comprising dozens, even hundreds, or listed and unlisted firms place the governance of large swathes of many countries' big business sectors in the hands of a few of their wealthiest families. These structures plausibly substitute for weak market institutions in economies undergoing rapid early-stage industrialization. They may also substitute for weak governments in coordinating Big Push growth programs to establish numerous interdependent simultaneously. However, no such role is evident in developed or in slowly growing developing economies, where such structures appear prone to agency problems and political rent-seeking. If sufficiently large, they may also add to economy volatility by rendering the risk of misgovernance systematic, rather than firm-specific.
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