{"title":"银行家和经纪人优先:中央银行政策制定理论中的漏洞","authors":"E. Kane","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.1960163","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"AbstractThe following sections are included:Misconceptions about Crises and Crisis ResponseCentral Bank and Government Rescue ProgramsRethinking Systemic RiskUsefulness of Capital Requirements has been OversoldUndone by the Regulatory DialecticRecommendations for ReformTraditional Reporting and Incentive Frameworks are InadequateReferences","PeriodicalId":302242,"journal":{"name":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","volume":"3 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2012-01-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"6","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bankers and Brokers First: Loose Ends in the Theory of Central-Bank Policymaking\",\"authors\":\"E. Kane\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.1960163\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"AbstractThe following sections are included:Misconceptions about Crises and Crisis ResponseCentral Bank and Government Rescue ProgramsRethinking Systemic RiskUsefulness of Capital Requirements has been OversoldUndone by the Regulatory DialecticRecommendations for ReformTraditional Reporting and Incentive Frameworks are InadequateReferences\",\"PeriodicalId\":302242,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"PSN: Regulation (Topic)\",\"volume\":\"3 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2012-01-26\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"6\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"PSN: Regulation (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1960163\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PSN: Regulation (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1960163","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Bankers and Brokers First: Loose Ends in the Theory of Central-Bank Policymaking
AbstractThe following sections are included:Misconceptions about Crises and Crisis ResponseCentral Bank and Government Rescue ProgramsRethinking Systemic RiskUsefulness of Capital Requirements has been OversoldUndone by the Regulatory DialecticRecommendations for ReformTraditional Reporting and Incentive Frameworks are InadequateReferences
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