{"title":"尽力而为","authors":"Marcin Drofiszyn","doi":"10.19195/1895-8001.17.4.6","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In my work I present a version of the semantics of relative preference for the logic of ought-to-be and for the logic of ought-to-do. I draw the philosophical inspirations for this semantics from Elzenberg’s axiological papers. In the semantics of relative preference I check which deontic principles are valid—especially those which Wolniewicz extracted from Elzenberg’s papers. I also check if it is possible in this semantics to fulfil the condition of the moral dilemma.","PeriodicalId":262683,"journal":{"name":"Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia","volume":"4 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-03-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Robić najlepsze, co jest do zrobienia\",\"authors\":\"Marcin Drofiszyn\",\"doi\":\"10.19195/1895-8001.17.4.6\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In my work I present a version of the semantics of relative preference for the logic of ought-to-be and for the logic of ought-to-do. I draw the philosophical inspirations for this semantics from Elzenberg’s axiological papers. In the semantics of relative preference I check which deontic principles are valid—especially those which Wolniewicz extracted from Elzenberg’s papers. I also check if it is possible in this semantics to fulfil the condition of the moral dilemma.\",\"PeriodicalId\":262683,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia\",\"volume\":\"4 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-03-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.17.4.6\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.19195/1895-8001.17.4.6","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
In my work I present a version of the semantics of relative preference for the logic of ought-to-be and for the logic of ought-to-do. I draw the philosophical inspirations for this semantics from Elzenberg’s axiological papers. In the semantics of relative preference I check which deontic principles are valid—especially those which Wolniewicz extracted from Elzenberg’s papers. I also check if it is possible in this semantics to fulfil the condition of the moral dilemma.