Alessandro Lieto, Eugenio Moro, Ilaria Malanchini, Silvio Mandelli, A. Capone
{"title":"动态资源市场下的网络切片协商策略","authors":"Alessandro Lieto, Eugenio Moro, Ilaria Malanchini, Silvio Mandelli, A. Capone","doi":"10.1109/WoWMoM.2019.8792999","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"One of the disruptive innovations introduced by 5G networks is the opportunity for a new group of stakeholders to be actively involved in the management of network slices with the role of tenants. This allows to go beyond the user-centric QoS paradigm of 4G, and to include tools for handling the aggregate performance of multiple services and user groups and to focus on slice resource management, also at the new 5G NR interface. So far, research efforts have privileged a first solution based on the concept of isolation between slices. However, proposed solutions are not particularly efficient due to the loss of pooling gains, and not very reliable due to variable channel conditions that with slice limited resources make performance not easily predictable. We propose a slice management framework where the shared resources are negotiated by tenants in a real-time market based on slice instantaneous demands. Our model, based on game theory, allows tenants to optimize their service strategies acquiring resources when and where it is necessary, according to the level of quality and reliability requested by the specific traffic types they handle. In this paper, we focus on modeling the game theoretical framework and on characterizing its equilibria in a multi-tenant scenario.","PeriodicalId":372377,"journal":{"name":"2019 IEEE 20th International Symposium on \"A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks\" (WoWMoM)","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"5","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Strategies for Network Slicing Negotiation in a Dynamic Resource Market\",\"authors\":\"Alessandro Lieto, Eugenio Moro, Ilaria Malanchini, Silvio Mandelli, A. Capone\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/WoWMoM.2019.8792999\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"One of the disruptive innovations introduced by 5G networks is the opportunity for a new group of stakeholders to be actively involved in the management of network slices with the role of tenants. This allows to go beyond the user-centric QoS paradigm of 4G, and to include tools for handling the aggregate performance of multiple services and user groups and to focus on slice resource management, also at the new 5G NR interface. So far, research efforts have privileged a first solution based on the concept of isolation between slices. However, proposed solutions are not particularly efficient due to the loss of pooling gains, and not very reliable due to variable channel conditions that with slice limited resources make performance not easily predictable. We propose a slice management framework where the shared resources are negotiated by tenants in a real-time market based on slice instantaneous demands. Our model, based on game theory, allows tenants to optimize their service strategies acquiring resources when and where it is necessary, according to the level of quality and reliability requested by the specific traffic types they handle. In this paper, we focus on modeling the game theoretical framework and on characterizing its equilibria in a multi-tenant scenario.\",\"PeriodicalId\":372377,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2019 IEEE 20th International Symposium on \\\"A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks\\\" (WoWMoM)\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-06-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"5\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2019 IEEE 20th International Symposium on \\\"A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks\\\" (WoWMoM)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/WoWMoM.2019.8792999\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2019 IEEE 20th International Symposium on \"A World of Wireless, Mobile and Multimedia Networks\" (WoWMoM)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/WoWMoM.2019.8792999","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Strategies for Network Slicing Negotiation in a Dynamic Resource Market
One of the disruptive innovations introduced by 5G networks is the opportunity for a new group of stakeholders to be actively involved in the management of network slices with the role of tenants. This allows to go beyond the user-centric QoS paradigm of 4G, and to include tools for handling the aggregate performance of multiple services and user groups and to focus on slice resource management, also at the new 5G NR interface. So far, research efforts have privileged a first solution based on the concept of isolation between slices. However, proposed solutions are not particularly efficient due to the loss of pooling gains, and not very reliable due to variable channel conditions that with slice limited resources make performance not easily predictable. We propose a slice management framework where the shared resources are negotiated by tenants in a real-time market based on slice instantaneous demands. Our model, based on game theory, allows tenants to optimize their service strategies acquiring resources when and where it is necessary, according to the level of quality and reliability requested by the specific traffic types they handle. In this paper, we focus on modeling the game theoretical framework and on characterizing its equilibria in a multi-tenant scenario.