Octavio Andrés García Aguilar, Luís Filipe Estevinha Rodrigues
{"title":"哲学分歧vs哲学知识","authors":"Octavio Andrés García Aguilar, Luís Filipe Estevinha Rodrigues","doi":"10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253892","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We will argue that philosophical disagreement gives us good reasons to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge. First, we will present the case of PHILOSOPHERS to produce a skeptical verdict when it comes to philosophical disagreements. Then, we will discuss the symmetry and centrality conditions to clarify why PHILOSOPHERS yields a skeptical verdict. Both conditions make philosophical disagreement an undefeated defeater for our philosophical beliefs. Second, we will discuss the Equal Weight (EW) as the view that requires parties to a disagreement to suspend judgment if parties comply with the symmetry and centrality conditions. Finally, we will discuss Kelly’s (2016) arguments against the skeptical outcomes of EW when applied to philosophical disagreement. We conclude that Kelly’s defense fails to defuse the skeptical outcomes of EW applied to philosophical disagreement.","PeriodicalId":191253,"journal":{"name":"Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986","volume":"18 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-05-03","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Philosophical disagreement versus philosophical knowledge\",\"authors\":\"Octavio Andrés García Aguilar, Luís Filipe Estevinha Rodrigues\",\"doi\":\"10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253892\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We will argue that philosophical disagreement gives us good reasons to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge. First, we will present the case of PHILOSOPHERS to produce a skeptical verdict when it comes to philosophical disagreements. Then, we will discuss the symmetry and centrality conditions to clarify why PHILOSOPHERS yields a skeptical verdict. Both conditions make philosophical disagreement an undefeated defeater for our philosophical beliefs. Second, we will discuss the Equal Weight (EW) as the view that requires parties to a disagreement to suspend judgment if parties comply with the symmetry and centrality conditions. Finally, we will discuss Kelly’s (2016) arguments against the skeptical outcomes of EW when applied to philosophical disagreement. We conclude that Kelly’s defense fails to defuse the skeptical outcomes of EW applied to philosophical disagreement.\",\"PeriodicalId\":191253,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2022-05-03\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253892\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Revista Perspectiva Filosófica - ISSN: 2357-9986","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.51359/2357-9986.2022.253892","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Philosophical disagreement versus philosophical knowledge
We will argue that philosophical disagreement gives us good reasons to be skeptical about philosophical knowledge. First, we will present the case of PHILOSOPHERS to produce a skeptical verdict when it comes to philosophical disagreements. Then, we will discuss the symmetry and centrality conditions to clarify why PHILOSOPHERS yields a skeptical verdict. Both conditions make philosophical disagreement an undefeated defeater for our philosophical beliefs. Second, we will discuss the Equal Weight (EW) as the view that requires parties to a disagreement to suspend judgment if parties comply with the symmetry and centrality conditions. Finally, we will discuss Kelly’s (2016) arguments against the skeptical outcomes of EW when applied to philosophical disagreement. We conclude that Kelly’s defense fails to defuse the skeptical outcomes of EW applied to philosophical disagreement.