收购中的管理所有权和运营改进

CGN: Private Equity Firms as Investors (Sub-Topic) Pub Date : 2021-10-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3934568

John B. Cassel

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我研究了在收购中获得的公司的管理所有权和经营绩效之间的关系。我表明，收购后CEO持有的高股权与公司盈利能力的提高有关。从经济角度来看，这一结果在股权变动时更为明显，而且只有在CEO留任时才会出现。当初始盈利能力较低且与削减成本有关时，股权比例会更高。总体而言，研究结果支持这样的观点，即改善管理层激励是收购中价值创造的重要组成部分。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Managerial Ownership and Operational Improvements in Buyouts

I examine the relationship between managerial ownership and operational performance for firms acquired in a buyout. I show that high post-buyout CEO ownership stakes are associated with improved firm profitability. This result is economically stronger for changes in ownership stakes, and is solely present when the CEO is retained. Ownership stakes are higher when initial profitability is low and is associated with cost cutting. Overall, the results support the view that improving managerial incentives is an important part of value creation in buyouts.

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CGN: Private Equity Firms as Investors (Sub-Topic)

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