基于移动目标防御和深度学习的电网协同网络物理攻击定位

Yexiang Chen, S. Lakshminarayana, Fei Teng
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引用次数: 3

摘要

协同网络物理攻击(ccpa)是针对电网的最复杂的攻击之一,它破坏电网的物理基础设施,并利用同时进行的网络攻击来掩盖其影响。这项工作提出了一种新的方法来检测这种攻击,并确定线路中断的位置(由于物理攻击)。建议的方法由三部分组成。首先,将移动目标防御(MTD)技术应用于通过分布式柔性交流输电系统(D-FACTS)器件主动扰动输电线路电抗的物理攻击;MTD使攻击者掩盖其物理攻击所需的知识失效。其次,利用卷积神经网络(cnn)从受损的测量数据中定位出线路中断的位置。最后,使用模型不可知元学习(MAML)来加速拓扑重构后CNN的训练速度(由于MTD),并减少数据/再训练时间要求。利用IEEE测试系统进行了仿真。实验结果表明,该方法可以有效地定位隐身ccpa中的线路中断。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Localization of Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids Using Moving Target Defense and Deep Learning
As one of the most sophisticated attacks against power grids, coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) damage the power grid's physical infrastructure and use a simultaneous cyber attack to mask its effect. This work proposes a novel approach to detect such attacks and identify the location of the line outages (due to the physical attack). The proposed approach consists of three parts. Firstly, moving target defense (MTD) is applied to expose the physical attack by actively perturbing transmission line reactance via distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. MTD invalidates the attackers' knowledge required to mask their physical attack. Secondly, convolution neural networks (CNNs) are applied to localize line outage position from the compromised measurements. Finally, model agnostic meta-learning (MAML) is used to accelerate the training speed of CNN following the topology reconfigurations (due to MTD) and reduce the data/retraining time requirements. Simulations are carried out using IEEE test systems. The experimental results demonstrate that the proposed approach can effectively localize line outages in stealthy CCPAs.
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