Created Things as Infinite and Limited

The chapter starts with Leibniz’s characterization of God, the most perfect Being, as infinite in a hypercategorematic sense—i.e. a being beyond any determination. In contrast to this, creatures are determinate beings; they are determinate and thus limited and particular expressions of the divine essence. However, for Leibniz, creatures are also infinite; thus, creatures are seen as infinite and limited. This leads to taking creatures to be infinite in kind, in distinction from the absolute and hypercategorematic infinity of God. The author presents three lines of argument to substantiate this point: (1) understanding creatures as entailing a particular sequence of perfections and imperfections; (2) understanding creatures under the rubric of an intermediate degree of infinity and perfection that, in 1676, Leibniz calls maximum or infinite in kind; and (3) observing that primitive force, a defining feature of created substance, may be seen as infinite in a metaphysical sense.