Modelling human cognition: a singular task

Summary form only given. The cognitive literature has debated at some length the rival merits of models in which there are associationist connections and implicit rules and models in which there are explicit, syntactically structured rules. Human cognition represents a singular challenge to both models for reasons that only emerge when we undertake an analysis of the nature of human cognitive adaptation to a world in which natural and social ecology are inextricably interwoven. It is clear that natural language has an important role in human cognition in both shaping and structuring many of the cognitive processes present in competent thinkers. Present studies in cognitive development suggest that an important part of the process is also based on the reactions and responses of adults in the child's presence. It therefore seems that it would be helpful to examine what exactly is produced when a system of semantic and syntactic operations are mastered by a linguistically competent thinker. The investigation begins with an understanding of the nature of thought and the constraints on any good theory of human thought. I try to make plausible the idea that such a theory gives central place to concepts and that these are marked by linguistically significant elements so that word meanings becomes a foundational feature of human thought. I argue that a semantic connection to the environmental conditions typically associated with the use of the work is one of two essential features of word meaning.