{"title":"道德实在论与康德建构主义","authors":"James A. Stieb","doi":"10.1111/j.1467-9337.2006.00335.x","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper questions nearly every major point Christina Lafont (2004) makes about the validity of social norms and their relation to moral realism and Kantian constructivism. I distinguish realisms from theories of objective or subjective knowledge, then from cognitivism. Next, I distinguish Kant and constructivism from Rawls' political constructivism. Finally, I propose clues for an alternative theory of moral constructivism.","PeriodicalId":431450,"journal":{"name":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","volume":"62 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-11-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Moral Realism and Kantian Constructivism\",\"authors\":\"James A. Stieb\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/j.1467-9337.2006.00335.x\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper questions nearly every major point Christina Lafont (2004) makes about the validity of social norms and their relation to moral realism and Kantian constructivism. I distinguish realisms from theories of objective or subjective knowledge, then from cognitivism. Next, I distinguish Kant and constructivism from Rawls' political constructivism. Finally, I propose clues for an alternative theory of moral constructivism.\",\"PeriodicalId\":431450,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"62 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2006-11-16\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2006.00335.x\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Jurisprudence & Legal Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9337.2006.00335.x","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper questions nearly every major point Christina Lafont (2004) makes about the validity of social norms and their relation to moral realism and Kantian constructivism. I distinguish realisms from theories of objective or subjective knowledge, then from cognitivism. Next, I distinguish Kant and constructivism from Rawls' political constructivism. Finally, I propose clues for an alternative theory of moral constructivism.
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