{"title":"论阿奎那对不可论证原则的认识中的归纳法作用","authors":"Predrag Milidrag","doi":"10.2298/theo2001017m","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The analysis of the 20th lectio of the second book of the Aquinas?s\n Commentary on the Posterior Analytics shows that he recognizes four types of\n non-demonstrable principles: axioms, definitions, hypotheses and so-called\n causal principles. The comparison of the axioms and the causal principles\n shows that the induction is necessary for the cognition of later ones; the\n interpretation that induction has the role in the cognition of all types of\n non-demonstrable principles is dismissed. The article makes the distinction\n between broad sense of induction (all cognition with the basis in sensed\n singulars) and strict sense of induction (the inductive process described in\n the Second Analytics). In the strict sense, the induction has no role in the\n cognition of the axioms; nevertlheless, in wider sense of the repeated\n sensations its role is to provide sensory information on the basis of which\n the intellect can apprehend the meaning of the terms used in the axiom.","PeriodicalId":374875,"journal":{"name":"Theoria, Beograd","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The role of induction in the cognition of non-demonstrable principles in Aquinas\",\"authors\":\"Predrag Milidrag\",\"doi\":\"10.2298/theo2001017m\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The analysis of the 20th lectio of the second book of the Aquinas?s\\n Commentary on the Posterior Analytics shows that he recognizes four types of\\n non-demonstrable principles: axioms, definitions, hypotheses and so-called\\n causal principles. The comparison of the axioms and the causal principles\\n shows that the induction is necessary for the cognition of later ones; the\\n interpretation that induction has the role in the cognition of all types of\\n non-demonstrable principles is dismissed. The article makes the distinction\\n between broad sense of induction (all cognition with the basis in sensed\\n singulars) and strict sense of induction (the inductive process described in\\n the Second Analytics). In the strict sense, the induction has no role in the\\n cognition of the axioms; nevertlheless, in wider sense of the repeated\\n sensations its role is to provide sensory information on the basis of which\\n the intellect can apprehend the meaning of the terms used in the axiom.\",\"PeriodicalId\":374875,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Theoria, Beograd\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Theoria, Beograd\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2001017m\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Theoria, Beograd","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2298/theo2001017m","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
The role of induction in the cognition of non-demonstrable principles in Aquinas
The analysis of the 20th lectio of the second book of the Aquinas?s
Commentary on the Posterior Analytics shows that he recognizes four types of
non-demonstrable principles: axioms, definitions, hypotheses and so-called
causal principles. The comparison of the axioms and the causal principles
shows that the induction is necessary for the cognition of later ones; the
interpretation that induction has the role in the cognition of all types of
non-demonstrable principles is dismissed. The article makes the distinction
between broad sense of induction (all cognition with the basis in sensed
singulars) and strict sense of induction (the inductive process described in
the Second Analytics). In the strict sense, the induction has no role in the
cognition of the axioms; nevertlheless, in wider sense of the repeated
sensations its role is to provide sensory information on the basis of which
the intellect can apprehend the meaning of the terms used in the axiom.