预算约束在顺序淘汰赛中的作用

Malin Arve, Olga Chiappinelli
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引用次数: 1

摘要

受欧盟商业前采购概念和欧洲经济中大量中小企业的存在的激励,我们研究了预算约束如何影响顺序淘汰赛的研发工作。我们证明了引入预算约束会导致无约束参赛者努力的非单调性。此外,我们还发现,如果预算不对称太大,不受约束的竞争对手会比只面对不受约束的竞争对手付出更高的努力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Role of Budget Contraints in Sequential Elimination Tournaments
Motivated by the EU concept of Pre-Commercial Procurement and the massivepresence of SMEs in the European economy, we study how budget constraints affect R&D effort in sequential elimination tournaments. We show that introducingbudget constraints leads to a non-monotonicity in unconstrained contestants' effort.Furthermore, we show that if the budget asymmetry is not too large, unconstrainedcontestants exert higher effort than when faced with unconstrained contestants only.
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